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I describe two studies in firm dynamics and macroeconomics. Chapter 1 
reports on the large decline in entrepreneurial activity that preceded and accompanied 
the Great Recession and proposes a model relating this decline to the housing 
collapse. The collapse in entrepreneurial activity coincided with a historic decline in 
home values that preceded the onset of the broad recession by at least nine months. I 
describe a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model with both housing and 
entrepreneurship. The model is characterized by financial frictions that affect both 
credit supply and credit demand. I consider the consequences of a “housing crisis” as 
compared to a “financial crisis.” The model produces a negative response of 
entrepreneurship to a housing crisis via a housing collateral channel; this mechanism 
can account for at least a quarter of the empirical decline in entrepreneurs’ share of 
activity. A financial crisis (which works through credit supply) has more nuanced 
effects, causing economic disruption that entices new low-productivity entrepreneurs 
into production.  
  
Chapter 2 describes a theory of endogenous firm-level risk over the business 
cycle based on endogenous firm market exposure. Firms that reach a larger number of 
markets diversify market-specific demand shocks at a cost. The model is driven only 
by total factor productivity shocks and captures the observed countercyclicality of 
firm-level risk. Consistent with the model, data from Compustat and the Longitudinal 
Business Database show that market reach is procyclical and that the 
countercyclicality of firm-level risk is driven mostly by those firms that adjust their 
market reach. This finding is explained by a negative elasticity between firm-level 
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This thesis consists of two essays that emphasize the role of firm 
heterogeneity in accounting for aggregate fluctuations. Chapter 1 explores the 
relationship between housing and entrepreneurship, with a focus on the role of 
housing as collateral for entrepreneurial credit access. Various measures of 
entrepreneurial activity declined precipitously leading into and during the Great 
Recession in the U.S., and I describe a model that can explain a portion of the decline 
in entrepreneurship as being the result of the decline in the value of housing. Chapter 
2 explores the relationship between firm-level volatility and the business cycle. In 
response to a large research literature that models the business cycle as being 
endogenous to volatility, I describe a model (constructed with coauthors) in which the 
business cycle actually drives volatility through a firm-level market diversification 
mechanism.  
 I summarize the chapters in more detail below, but first it is useful to take a 
step back and briefly describe the development of the firm dynamics research context 
in which the chapters fit. Much of modern macroeconomics involves the study of 
economic growth and aggregate fluctuations through the lens of formal models. In 
such models, the production of goods is often conducted by a single representative 
firm. This modeling approach can yield significant insights—both qualitative and 
quantitative—into the workings of market economies. However, a large body of 
research suggests that the ways in which firms differ, both in the cross section and 




Firm dynamics is the study of the relationship between individual firms and 
the broader economy. This firm-based approach allows for models motivated by 
microeconomic data and accommodates rich interactions of firms with labor, 
financial, and product markets. The interactions can depend on individual firm 
characteristics including age, size, industry, and productivity; in turn, the nature of 
macroeconomic fluctuations may depend in part on the economy’s composition of 
firms along these dimensions (e.g., Pugsley and Şahin (2014)). Moreover, extensive 
reallocation of resources routinely occurs even within narrow classes of firms. Firm 
dynamics is the study of creative destruction—the costly but productivity-enhancing 
process by which firms, industries, and economies are constantly reinvented, 
originally defined and described by Joseph Schumpeter (Schumpeter (1935, 1942)). 
The modern approach to modeling firm dynamics goes back at least to 
Jovanovic (1982). Motivated by evidence about the high and volatile growth of 
surviving young firms, Jovanovic constructed a model in which young firms must 
gradually learn about their own productivity and expand or contract according to what 
they learn. This framework can explain the high growth rates among young firms 
observed in the data. The selection mechanism through which productive firms grow 
and unproductive firms shrink or exit is a key concept in firm dynamics, and the 
idiosyncratic nature of firm-level productivity can account for heterogeneity in 
observed firm size distributions. Related work by Ericson and Pakes (1992) generates 
similar results with rich entry and exit dynamics. Lambson (1991) showed that firm-
level sunk costs and uncertain future factor prices can give rise to wide within-




research. While these studies occurred in the context of industrial organization 
research, they would have large implications in macroeconomics. Indeed, firm 
dynamics sits at the intersection of macroeconomics with industrial organization, 
labor, corporate finance, and other subfields. 
Hopenhayn (1992) innovated on the firm dynamics framework by providing a 
tractable model that can account for generally high rates of gross job flows and the 
stochastically increasing size distribution of firms by age class. This class of models 
would prove extremely useful for understanding the relationship between firm 
dynamics and macroeconomics. For example, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) 
showed that frictions that impede the job destruction process reduce total employment 
in the long run. Cooley and Quadrini (2001) showed that persistent firm-level 
productivity shocks in an environment characterized by financial frictions can 
generate the empirical regularities of declining rates of dynamism by firm size 
(conditional on age) and by firm age (conditional on size). 
  The development of models of firm dynamics provided a lens through which 
to interpret increasingly available microeconomic data on firm behavior. Davis, 
Haltiwanger, and Shuh (1996) and later work document a U.S. economy 
characterized by a high pace of job creation and job destruction, which theory 
suggests can be the result of constantly changing idiosyncratic conditions faced by 




shocks, or the acquisition of new knowledge—and the ways in which firms respond 
to those conditions.1  
Davis, Haltiwanger, and Shuh (1996) show that the bulk of variation in plant-
level outcomes cannot be explained by observable firm characteristics. Moreover, the 
data on firm dynamics present several serious challenges to the representative agent 
approach to the study of business cycles. Gross job destruction exhibits more 
volatility and cyclicality than gross job creation.2 Total reallocation (the sum of job 
creation and job destruction) is typically countercyclical. The business cycle involves 
not only changes in average firm growth rates but also changes in the dispersion and 
skewness of the growth rate distribution. Furthermore, some of these facts are subject 
to change over time; for example, while most recent recessions were characterized by 
countercyclical job destruction and (relatively) acyclical job creation, the Great 
Recession involved a dramatic decline in job creation and a decline in total 
reallocation, resembling some pre-1970s recessions. Both the similarities and the 
differences between recessions suggest the importance of heterogeneity for growth 
and business cycle dynamics. Additionally, recent research indicates that various 
measures of gross flows and reallocation have seen declines in recent decades, 
particularly since 2000.3  
                                                 
1 Here, “job creation” refers to jobs added by entering or expanding business establishments; “job 
destruction” refers to jobs eliminated by shrinking or exiting business establishments. Reallocation is 
the sum of job creation and job destruction. 
 
2 Much progress has been made on this and related questions. For example, Caballero (2007) shows 
how factor specificity can explain the decoupling of job creation and job destruction. 
 
3 See Davis and Haltiwanger (2014); Decker et al. (2014, 2015); Foster, Grim, and Haltiwanger (2014); 




 Among the macroeconomic implications of reallocation is its role in aggregate 
productivity growth. Productivity dispersion is significant, even within industries 
(Syverson (2011)); exploring the sources of this dispersion is a key element of the 
firm dynamics literature. Growth in aggregate productivity requires not only advances 
in technology and business methods but also movement of productive resources from 
low-productivity to high-productivity businesses. Evidence from the manufacturing 
industry suggests that about one-third of aggregate productivity growth is driven by 
reallocation (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008)). Firm entry is a key aspect of 
reallocation, and even the portion of productivity growth that occurs within 
establishments may be closely linked to questions of firm dynamics. 
Changes in the distribution of productivity across firms can have large 
aggregate implications. Khan and Thomas (2013) study a model in which financial 
frictions and capital specificity facilitate large, persistent responses of aggregate 
productivity and output to financial shocks due to misallocation of capital among 
firms. Unproductive firms hold too much productive capital, and productive firms—
particularly young firms—hold too little. Midrigan and Xu (2013) show that finance-
driven misallocation problems are most pronounced along the margins of firm entry 
and technology adoption. More broadly, policy or other frictions that distort selection 
and reallocation can empirically account for large differences in aggregate 
performance across countries (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013)). 
 Another significant contribution of firm dynamics research is a better 
understanding of the sources of aggregate employment growth. For a time, evidence 




(Neumark, Wall, and Zhang (2011)). Further research showed—consistent with 
theory described above—that this only reflected the facts that many young firms are 
small and that young firms account for a large share of both net and gross job creation 
(Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2013)). This evidence implies an important labor 
market role for entrepreneurship; in particular, since most entrepreneurs have little or 
no growth potential (Hurst and Pugsley (2011)), a large share of job growth is 
accounted for by a small number of high-growth, young firms. 
 A focus on entrepreneurship has become a significant part of firm dynamics 
research. Quadrini (2000) innovated on firm dynamics models by linking firms to 
households; his model shows that a link between firm credit access and household 
finances in the presence of financial frictions can explain large wealth differences 
between workers and entrepreneurs as well as the high wealth concentration observed 
in the U.S. Buera (2009) builds a similar model for exploring the relationship 
between personal wealth and entrepreneurship.4  
A key characteristic of entrepreneurship is the relationship between firm 
finances and the personal characteristics of firm owners. This relationship implies 
multiple feedback mechanisms between firm dynamics and the economy: broad 
economic conditions can affect entrepreneurial activity through household channels, 
while the evidence on young firms described above posits an important role for 
entrepreneurship in aggregate job market conditions. 
The Great Recession was preceded and accompanied by a historically large 
decline in various measures of entrepreneurial activity. In Chapter 1, I describe 
                                                 
4 Empirically, the relationship between personal wealth and entrepreneurship is complicated; see Hurst 




original research suggesting that the collapse of house prices played a significant role 
in the decline in entrepreneurship. Housing is an important source of collateral for 
entrepreneurs, so the decline in the value of housing tightened financial conditions 
faced by young firms. A growing body of empirical evidence supports this proposed 
mechanism (Adelino, Schoar, and Severino forthcoming; Fort et al. (2013); Mehrotra 
and Sergeyev (2014)).  
I conduct a quantitative theory exercise to understand the importance of this 
channel. I build a general equilibrium heterogeneous agent model in which 
households can choose to be workers or entrepreneurs. I use the model to run 
comparative static experiments contrasting the effects of a house price decline with 
the effects of an increase in borrowing costs across the economy. The model suggests 
that the decline in house prices may explain a quarter or more of the decline in 
entrepreneurs’ share of aggregate employment, where entrepreneurs are defined as 
young firms and/or sole proprietorships. More generally, my results indicate that 
accounting for the link between household characteristics and entrepreneurship is 
important for understanding the Great Recession—and it may be important in future 
downturns as well. 
The research I describe in Chapter 1 suggests the need for further research 
into the relationship between housing and entrepreneurship. Quantifying the ultimate 
effect of the entrepreneurial collateral channel on aggregate unemployment is an 
important priority and can be done with extensions to the modeling framework I 
provide. It is also important to relate the entrepreneurial collateral channel to other 




consumption channel (Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013)) and the residential construction 
channel (Leamer (2007)). 
Chapter 2 focuses on a different aspect of firm dynamics. There is increasing 
interest in the relationship between firm-level volatility and the business cycle in 
macroeconomics. One manifestation of this interest is a growing literature on the 
effects of uncertainty—the volatility of potential future outcomes—on the business 
cycle; this literature originated with Bloom (2009). The “Bloom Fact” is the empirical 
regularity that various measures of volatility, including outcome volatility at the firm 
level, are countercyclical—volatility rises during recessions and falls during 
expansions. Much of the existing research on this topic interprets causality as running 
from volatility to booms and busts. In Chapter 2, I describe original research 
(conducted jointly with Pablo D’Erasmo and Hernan Moscoso Boedo) suggesting that 
causality runs in the opposite direction through a mechanism that illustrates the value 
of the firm dynamics research agenda.  
We constructed a model in which individual firms make decisions about how 
many product or geographic markets to service. Firms with exposure to more markets 
face less risk due to being more diversified against market-specific demand shocks. 
As a result, firm-level volatility is negatively correlated with the number of markets 
to which firms have exposure. Firm decisions about market reach depend in part on 
aggregate conditions: during booms, many firms can increase profits by expanding to 
more markets, thereby becoming less volatile (despite lacking an actual 
diversification motive). During recessions, many firms reduce their market exposure, 




Fact—driven by aggregate first-moment shocks and the heterogeneous responses of 
firms to them. 
We provide evidence in favor of our model by outlining several of its 
empirical predictions and comparing them with data. In the data, we find that firm-
level market exposure is indeed procyclical; moreover, as predicted, firms that adjust 
their market exposure over the cycle experience countercyclical volatility (while 
firms that do not adjust experience acyclical volatility). The results of the study 
suggest that economists cannot treat volatility as exogenous to the business cycle—an 
insight that will be important in future research into the role of volatility and 
uncertainty in macroeconomics. More broadly, the study provides an example of how 
an understanding of the relationship between firm-level conditions and the broader 
economy can shed light on important questions in macroeconomics. 
Chapter 1 contributes to the firm dynamics literature by highlighting the role 
of personal characteristics in entrepreneurial activity. Firm behavior—specifically the 
behavior of young and small firms—is closely linked to household behavior. In 
particular, the chapter adds to the growing list of reasons for economists to carefully 
study housing markets. Moreover, recessions that involve negative shocks to 
households are likely to be characterized by distressed entrepreneurship, and the 
literature that I describe above suggests that this has significant implications for 
aggregate employment growth. Chapter 2 innovates on the firm dynamics literature 
by, first, showing that the causal link between volatility and the business cycle is 
more nuanced than is typically assumed, and second, highlighting the role that 




of Large Numbers does not hold, idiosyncratic economic shocks do not “average out” 
as is assumed by the representative agent framework. 
The common theme across the two chapters is that heterogeneity is important 
at both the theoretical and empirical levels in macroeconomics. Models that treat 
heterogeneity as an essential characteristic of the economy have the potential to 
explain empirical facts that are not consistent with workhorse representative agent 
approaches. These facts have large implications for productivity, labor markets, 
growth, and business cycles. Recent events have led to questions about the future path 
of the macroeconomics discipline (Caballero (2010)); a focus on heterogeneity has 
the potential to supplement the insights of the workhorse approach without discarding 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
The Great Recession was preceded by a simultaneous decline in house prices 
and entrepreneurial activity, both of which were largely unprecedented in scale. 
Given the crucial job market role played by young firms, understanding the cause of 
the collapse in entrepreneurship is important. A growing empirical literature finds a 
close relationship between house prices and entrepreneurial activity and suggests the 
importance of housing collateral for entrepreneurial finance (Adelino, Schoar, and 
Severino (2013), Fort et al. (2013), Mehrotra and Sergeyev (2014)). Other literature 
points to credit supply frictions as key drivers of the Great Recession (Adrian, Colla, 
and Shin (2013)). What can account for the collapse in entrepreneurship? In 
particular, is the housing crisis to blame, or is the broader financial crisis that 
followed more likely to have caused the decline? 
In this chapter, I explore the collapse in entrepreneurship by constructing a 
model to contrast the effects of a housing crisis (which affects entrepreneurship 
through credit demand) with a financial crisis (which affects all firms through credit 
supply). The contribution of the model is to show that entrepreneurial activity 
declines in response to a housing crisis but not a financial crisis. Housing is an 
important source of collateral for entrepreneurs, while corporate firms are financed 




roughly the same direct effect on all types of firms, so it is incapable of causing a 
disproportionate decline in entrepreneurship. More generally, the model’s results 
suggest that recessions associated with a housing crisis are likely to be accompanied 
by depressed employment among entrepreneurs, with potentially broad implications 
for aggregate job growth. 
Understanding the cause of the collapse in entrepreneurship is important 
because young firms play a disproportionate role in aggregate job creation 
(Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2013); Haltiwanger (2012)). Fort et al. (2013) 
suggest that young firms account for about 22 percent of the decline in net job growth 
associated with the Great Recession. Consider the simple, rough counterfactual 
reported in Figure 1. Define an “entrepreneur” as any firm that is less than six years 
old or is a sole proprietorship. In 2006, the share of non-construction employment 
accounted for by entrepreneurs was 17 percent.1 Suppose this share had stayed 
constant through 2011, while non-entrepreneurial employment remained as its actual 
annual levels observed in the data.2 As Figure 1.1 shows, counterfactual employment 
has a higher peak in 2008, and the counterfactual trough in 2010 exceeds actual 
employment by about two million jobs. The observation for 2011 further shows a 
stronger recovery in the counterfactual. This is not a rigorous counterfactual, but it 
illustrates the large role played by entrepreneurs in the Great Recession.3 
                                                 
1 Data are from the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Business Database. Employment data are reported 
as of March 12 of a given year. The construction industry is defined as two-digit NAICS code 23. 
2 Specifically, the counterfactual is constructed as follows: In 2006, non-construction entrepreneurs’ 
share of total non-construction employment was 17 percent. Then the non-entrepreneurial share of 
employment was 83 percent. Let  be non-entrepreneurial employment at time , and let  be 
counterfactual aggregate employment in time . Then  =  0.83⁄  for every . 






Figure 1.1: Accounting Counterfactual 
 
In principle, two key channels could link a housing crisis with the share of 
economic activity accounted for by entrepreneurs. The first is a housing demand 
mechanism, where entrepreneurs in the construction sector and related sectors 
become distressed when demand for new housing falls.4 In the present study I abstract 
from this channel. The other possible channel operates through the balance sheets of 
entrepreneurs. Houses form a significant share of household assets, and 
entrepreneurial credit access depends heavily on the household assets of firm owners. 
In the decade prior to the housing crisis, households were increasingly able to “use 
                                                 
4 In 2006 entrepreneurial firms accounted for 30 percent of construction employment, compared with 




their house as an ATM,” including for business finance. In the model I describe 
below, entrepreneurial borrowing is constrained by the value of entrepreneurs’ 
personal asset holdings, including housing. The corporate sector faces no such 
constraints. This modeling approach is motivated by the notion that large, established 
firms can access credit through bond and commercial paper markets or large-scale 
bank borrowing, sources that do not depend on the asset holdings of firm owners. 
Conversely, entrepreneurs face constraints on borrowing based on their personal 
ability to supply collateral. 
The effects of house prices on bank balance sheets and consumer spending 
have been studied extensively, and there is a large literature on the effect of financial 
constraints on job flows, the firm age (and size) distribution, and entrepreneurship. 
However, the relationship between housing and entrepreneurship has received less 
attention. I construct a heterogeneous agent DSGE model, based on the 
macroeconomic literature studying entrepreneurship, in which housing plays a 
collateral role for potential entrepreneurs. In the model, I define a “housing crisis” as 
(1) a decline in the house price caused by a taste shock, (2) a decline in the house 
price caused by a housing supply shock, or (3) a decline in the maximum loan-to-
value ratio available to households. I define a “financial crisis” as a shock to 
intermediation costs that manifests itself through a higher credit spread. Thus, the 
housing crisis operates through a credit demand channel by affecting household 
balance sheets, while the financial crisis operates through a credit supply channel and 
affects all firms (rather than only entrepreneurs). I conduct a comparative static 




account for at least a quarter of the decline in entrepreneurs’ share of employment. In 
contrast, the financial crisis has large effects on total output but does not reduce 
entrepreneurial activity disproportionately. 
The model includes a corporate sector that is not subject to collateral 
constraints. As a result, shocks to the entrepreneurs’ collateral constraint need not 
affect aggregate production, since corporate firms can increase output in response to 
reduced entrepreneurial activity. In this respect, the quantitative results I describe 
may be thought of as a lower bound on the effects of housing crises (and collateral 
shocks broadly) on entrepreneurial job creation. In the absence of a healthy non-
entrepreneurial sector, aggregate demand effects could result in further reductions in 
entrepreneurial activity following a housing crisis. 
The present study does not attempt to explain the path of house prices during 
the last decade, taking the large post-2006 decline as exogenous to aggregate 
entrepreneurial activity. I generate a housing price decline either with a shock to 
housing preferences assuming constant housing supply or with shock to housing 
supply assuming constant preferences.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes evidence and literature 
relevant to housing and entrepreneurship. Section 3 describes the model in detail. 
Section 4 describes the model calibration. Section 5 describes results from stationary 





Section 2: Evidence and Previous Literature 
2.1: Data on Housing and Young Firms 
 
The Great Recession was preceded by a sharp decline in the number of new 
firms and the number of jobs created by startups and entrepreneurs (see Haltiwanger, 
Jarmin, and Miranda (2011)); this fact holds even when the construction sector is 
ignored. Figure 1.2 shows data on startups as a share of firms and employment, 
detrended linearly to abstract from long-term trends.5 While startup activity may be a 
leading indicator generally, the most recent startup collapse was historically large.6 
The timing of the decline in startup activity coincides broadly with the peak and 
deterioration of house prices and home equity. Figure 1.3 plots measures of startup 
activity (omitting construction) against the S&P/Case-Shiller national house price 
index and the value of owners’ equity in real estate (from the Federal Reserve’s Flow 
of Funds), with all series normalized by their year-2000 levels.7 The top panel of 
Figure 1.3 shows the numbers of startup firms and startup jobs, and the bottom panel  
 
                                                 
5 I define a startup as a firm with age zero. Data on startups are from Business Dynamics Statistics, a 
publicly available dataset starting in the late 1970s that aggregates administrative data on the universe 
of private nonfarm establishments; establishments are observed in March of each year. Recession bars 
in Figure 1.2 are also based on annual data, where the following years count as recessions: 1981-1982, 
1990, 2001, and 2008-2009. According to the NBER, the most recent recession began in December 
2007 and ended in July 2009. 
6 Many startups are small, and the decline in small firm job creation in the mid-2000s expansion has 
been documented before (see Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2008) and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay 
(2012)). These explanations fail to distinguish between young and small firms, however, and given the 
specific role of young firms in job creation, additional focus on young firms is warranted. For data on 
the secular decline in entrepreneurship see Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2012) and Decker et al. 
(2014). 













shows startup firms and startup job creation as shares of overall firm totals.8 Both the 
house price series and the real estate equity series are reported quarterly; Figure 1.3 
annualizes the quarterly data by simply using the first quarter of each year.9 Startup 
firm and jobs data are reported annually in March. 
Readers should interpret the timing as follows: in the top panel of Figure 1.3, 
the number of startup firms and startup job creation peak in March 2006, and these 
peaks coincide with the peaks in first-quarter house prices and home equity. The 
bottom panel of Figure 1.3 shows that the share of aggregate job creation due to 
startups also peaks in March 2006.10 In short, both panels of the figure show that 
house prices and startup activity fell between March 2006 and March 2007, while the 
NBER defines the Great Recession as beginning in December 2007. Hence, the 
declines in house prices and startup activity led the recession by between nine and 
twenty-one months. 
The timing indicates that demand-side factors or broad financial sector 
explanations for the link between startups and house prices may be inapplicable. For 
example, Figure 1.4 plots fixed nonresidential investment, investment in equipment 
and software, and fixed residential investment. The slowdown in startup activity that 
began between March 2006 and March 2007 was coincident with the decline in 
residential investment but preceded the decline in other measures of investment.  
                                                 
8 The job creation measure is actually the startup component of the overall job creation rate, where the 
job creation rate is constructed as in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Shuh (1996). 
9 Note that the quarterly S&P/Case-Shiller house price index is actually a three-month trailing moving 
average (S&P (2014)). 
10 This measure is constructed using data reported in both march 2006 and March 2005; it is the 
number of jobs accounted for by startups as of March 2006 divided by the average of the number of 




Figure 1.4: National Investment 
 
 
As another example, Figure 1.5 plots two measures of corporate spreads over 
time. Spreads did not begin rising until late 2007, and extreme highs were not reached 
until late 2008. The recession and broad financial sector stress started too late to 
explain the decline in entrepreneurial activity. 
The empirical relationship between house prices and young firm activity is 
documented and explored more formally by Fort et al. (2013). The authors employ 
panel vector autoregression to isolate the effect of temporally exogenous variation in 
house prices on young firm activity at the state level, concluding that “the collapse in 
housing prices play[ed] a critical role” in the dramatic decline in new firm formation 
and young firm job flows prior to and during the Great Recession. More evidence is 




elasticities from Saiz (2010) as an instrument for house price changes at the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level, the authors find that exogenous increases 
in house prices between 2002 and 2007 (where “exogenous” is defined in terms of the  
 
Figure 1.5: Financial Stress 
 
 
elasticity instrument) were associated with increased employment in small businesses 
relative to large businesses. This effect is particularly strong for businesses in 
industries that typically rely heavily on external financing, and the effect is strong 
even in tradeable industries, implying that the effect of house prices is not solely due 




(2014) find similar MSA-level results for young firms.11 The present study provides a 
structural explanation for the empirical relationship between house prices and 
entrepreneurship. 
 
2.2: Young and Small Business Credit 
 
Firm size has a large impact on credit access (Cole and Wolken (1995)). Small 
businesses borrow primarily from commercial banks rather than by issuing debt 
securities. Small firms also frequently use credit cards and other “nontraditional” 
finance sources (Mishkin (2008); Small Business Administration (2011)). Many 
young firms are small and may therefore be subject to such financial constraints. 
Adrian, Colla, and Shin (2013) report that large firms were largely able to replace 
bank financing with bond financing in the wake of the financial crisis, but this is not 
an option available to most young and small firms. 
Entrepreneurial credit often lies at the intersection of business and household 
lending (Cole and Wolken (1995)). The Federal Reserve Board conducts a quarterly 
survey of senior loan officers at approximately sixty domestic banks and some 
foreign banks operating domestically (all past surveys are available at Federal 
Reserve Board (2014)). The 2007 surveys indicate a gradual but steady move toward 
tighter mortgage lending standards, although they have no direct questions about 
collateral. The January 2008 survey found that “between about 70 percent and 80 
                                                 
11 In the present study I focus on the relationship between house values and the ability of entrepreneurs 
to finance business activities; a related literature examines the relationship between house values and 
consumer spending. That housing matters for consumer decisions and aggregate fluctuations has been 
well documented (see, e.g., Cooper (2013); Mian and Sufi (2011); Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2013); and 
Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2014)). However, the consumption channel cannot explain the 
disproportionate decline in entrepreneurial activity. Moreover, Fort et al. (2013) note that, given the 
tendency of young firm finances to be linked to household finances, the Mian et al. results are not 




percent of domestic respondents expect the quality of their prime, nontraditional, and 
subprime residential mortgage loans, as well as of their revolving home equity loans, 
to deteriorate in 2008.” The April 2008 survey found that “all respondents pointed to 
declines in the value of the collateral significantly below the appraised value for the 
purposes of the HELOCs [home equity lines of credit] as reasons for tightening terms 
on those lines.” Subsequent surveys indicated ongoing tightening of HELOC 
standards. Overall, while the surveys do not provide direct evidence about housing 
collateral and business lending, they do indicate steadily stricter loan-to-value ratios 
and other standards starting in late 2006 as lenders began to notice that lending 
against houses was becoming riskier.12 
The relationship between house prices and entrepreneurship has changed over 
the last two decades. Few small businesses reported reliance on mortgage credit in 
1993 (Cole and Wolken (1995)), but this number increased during the 1990s (Bitler, 
Robb, and Wolken (2001)). Growth in entrepreneurs’ reliance on credit lines and 
bank loans during this period is also evident (Mach and Wolken (2006)), but the 
nature of the collateral backing these lines is difficult to determine in the data. By 
2007, about one quarter of small business owners reported that they used home equity 
for business financing (Schweitzer and Shane (2010)); the evidence I report in 
                                                 
12 In June 2012, I collected some limited anecdotal evidence by interviewing several community 
bankers. Each of them reported that collateral was the key criterion used to evaluate loan applications 
from prospective business creators. The bankers gave some weight to earnings history for older firms, 
but new firms lack such history. The dominant (and almost sole) sources of collateral for new firms 
were structures, with personal homes being very common. One banker reported having watched local 
housing conditions carefully during the house price decline, even in the context of non-construction 
business lending decisions. The bankers also reported sharp declines in loan-to-value ratios. One 
banker reported that, prior to 2006, small businesses often received loans in excess of 100 percent of 
collateral value, while all bankers reported that loan-to-value ratios were typically below 80 percent 




footnote 12 suggests that the share may be even higher for young businesses 
specifically.  
I take these changes in entrepreneurial finance as exogenous; that is, I do not 
investigate why home equity-related business borrowing grew in recent decades. My 
model is not intended to explain entrepreneurial activity prior to the wide availability 
of home equity-based borrowing, so I would not expect the relationship between 
house prices and startups to be as strong in previous years. Regardless, my findings 
are likely to have broad implications not only for the Great Recession but also for 
future periods of housing crisis or collateral crisis generally. 
While it is difficult to investigate the role of housing collateral for startup 
credit directly, it is clear that (a) new (and small) firms largely lack access to the 
types of credit facilities enjoyed by large firms, and (b) young and small firms rely 
heavily on external credit for operation (Robb and Robinson (2012)). Lacking any 
earnings history, new firms’ access to credit therefore depends in large part on 
collateral. These observations are consistent with an important role for the decline in 
housing collateral value in the recent decline of entrepreneurial activity. 
 
2.3: Financial Constraints and Entrepreneurship 
 
Several empirical studies have found evidence of financially constrained 
behavior among young firms, or at least dependence of growth paths on initial assets. 
These include Angelini and Generale (2008) (using Italian data); Huynh and Petrunia 
(2010) (using Canadian data); Chaney, Sraer, and Thesman (2012); and Kleiner 




from the distribution of unconstrained firms, and the number of firms facing financial 
constraints is nontrivial. Firms with more initial assets grow faster, and real estate 
holdings in particular often serve as collateral and therefore can constrain investment 
and growth. 
Theoretical research using heterogeneous agent models following Hopenhayn 
(1992) has found that including financial constraints can improve the models’ ability 
to match U.S. data. Firm dynamics models find that financial frictions can account for 
the conditional size and age distributions of firms (Cooley and Quadrini (2001); 
D’Erasmo (2011)) and can cause persistent drops in productivity and output (Khan 
and Thomas (2013)). Entrepreneurship in particular has been studied with a variety of 
structural models (see Quadrini (2009)). Quadrini (2000) divides production between 
corporate and non-corporate sectors, allowing for separation between firm and 
household decisions for large, established firms while allowing household 
characteristics to have a strong impact on startup activity. Models with 
entrepreneurship typically find significant consequences of borrowing constraints for 
households.13 Several recent studies focus on collateral and entrepreneurship in the 
Great Recession specifically (see Siemer (2014) and Mehrotra and Sergeyev 
(2014)).14 
                                                 
13 Buera (2009) estimates the welfare costs of borrowing constraints to be about 6 percent of lifetime 
consumption. Cagettti and De Nardi (2006) argue that “the tightness of borrowing constraints and 
voluntary bequests are the main forces in determining the number of entrepreneurs, the size of their 
firms, the overall wealth concentration in the population, and the aggregate capital accumulation” 
(866). See also Bassetto, Cagetti, and De Nardi (2015). 
14 Hurst and Lusardi (2004) raised some controversy by finding no evidence of a strong relationship 
between household wealth and the entrepreneurship decision among PSID households. However, 
Fairlie and Krashinsky (2012) argue that the Hurst and Lusardi (2004) results are mitigated when one 
distinguishes between entrepreneurial entry decisions driven by job loss and other reasons for entry. 




A growing literature studies housing in general equilibrium models (e.g., 
Iacoviello (2010), Iacoviello and Neri (2010), Iacoviello (2014), Guerrireri and 
Lorenzoni (2011), and Iacoviello and Pavan (2013)). Corradin and Popov (2013) 
construct a simple partial equilibrium model in which housing collateral matters for 
entrepreneurial decisions, but the model is highly stylized and largely abstracts from 
housing choice and differences between entrepreneurs and other firms. 
To summarize, quantitative theory exercises and empirical evidence suggest 
that borrowing constraints are highly relevant for new businesses, and there is 
evidence that such constraints were among the key drivers of the real economy before 
and during the Great Recession. Moreover, as the primary element of household 
balance sheets, home equity plays a potentially significant role in the financing 
constraints facing new firms. The unique contribution of the present study is to 
investigate the pre-Great Recession collapse in entrepreneurial activity by comparing 
the consequences of a housing crisis (which acts as a credit demand friction) with a 
financial crisis (which acts as a credit supply friction) in a general equilibrium model 
that recognizes differences between entrepreneurs and larger, established firms. 
 
 
Section 3: Model 
 
Consider a model of entrepreneurship based on Buera, Kaboski, and Shin 
(2011) but augmented with housing (as in Iacoviello and Pavan (2013)) and a 
corporate production sector (as in Quadrini (2000)). Households choose whether to be 
                                                                                                                                           





workers or entrepreneurs. Housing can be owned or rented; owned housing can be 
used as collateral for consumer loans or capital rental. Housing supply is exogenous 
and constant. Households are distributed over a four-dimensional state space based on 
financial assets, owned housing, previous occupational status (so that new 
entrepreneurs may differ from incumbents) and entrepreneurial productivity (which is 
responsible for generating a wealth distribution). Output is produced by both 
entrepreneurs and a representative corporate firm. 
A zero-profit financial sector borrows from households with positive savings 
to supply loanable funds, rental housing, and productive capital to entrepreneurs and 
the corporate firm. Loanable funds and rental capital are produced at an exogenously 
determined cost; in equilibrium this cost is manifested as a credit spread paid by 






There is a unit measure of infinitely lived households, each of which chooses 
either to be an entrepreneur or to supply one unit of labor. Preferences are given by: 
   (, )  ,  
where  denotes nondurable consumption,  denotes the flow of housing 
consumption, and  ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. Hereafter I use recursive notation 
such that  indicates current-period flows and  indicates intertemporal choices 




 (, ) =  !"1 − $% + ' (() !)1 − $*  , (1) 
where ( governs a utility penalty for renting, with ( < 1 for renters and ( = 1 for 
homeowners (as in Iacoviello and Pavan (2013)). In the computational exercises 
described below, housing is discrete and can be owned in increments of 500 square 
feet, and rented houses cannot exceed 2,500 square feet.15 The household’s owned 
housing stock is given by state variable ℎ, where 
 ℎ = - if owner0 if renter  . (2) 
Whether a household owns or rents and, if owning, the amount of owned housing 
consumed are chosen in the previous period. This reflects time costs associated with 
home purchases and is consistent with the timing of the borrowing constraint 
described below. Note that this implies that the binary tenure decision is also made 
one period in advance, but the rental housing quantity decision is made in the same 
period in which it is consumed. 
 Housing is durable and does not depreciate. Nondurable consumption is the 
numeraire. Housing can be purchased at price 0 or rented from the financial 
intermediary at rate 1* (such that rented housing in quantity  costs 1*0). Owned 
housing adjustment is costly as in Iacoviello and Pavan (2013) with cost equal to 20ℎ 
(this cost applies whenever ℎ ≠ ℎ). This cost may be thought of as including realtor 
fees or renovation inconveniences, costs that are proportional to the market value of 
housing and housing materials. Note that a household changing from owning to 
renting pays this fee, as does an owning household that changes the size of its house. 
                                                 
15 The 2007 American Housing Survey reports that less than 9 percent of renting households live in 
houses larger than 2,500 square feet. In the model, the cap on rental unit size captures the notion that 




A household changing from renting to owning does not pay this cost as ℎ = 0 in this 
case. Rental housing contracts last only one period and are opened and closed without 
friction, so renting households can change their housing consumption freely. This 
setup is an attempt to capture the notion that housing consumption is much more 
flexible for renters than for owners. 
 Households can be entrepreneurs ( = 1) or workers ( = 0); entrepreneurs 
have profits from decreasing returns to scale production while workers receive wage 
4. The household has access to asset 5 for saving or borrowing at rate  16. 
 All household borrowing—both loanable funds and capital rental—is subject 
to a borrowing constraint: 
 7 < 5 + 80ℎ , (3) 
where 7 is capital demand for entrepreneurial production (with 7 = 0 for workers). 
Positive 5 indicates positive savings while negative 5 reflects borrowing; households 
may borrow up to the collateral value of their owned housing, given by 80ℎ (so 
renters may not borrow at all and must have positive savings to engage in 
entrepreneurial production). When 7 = 0, the borrowing constraint may be thought of 
as a simple mortgage with loan-to-value ratio 8. The borrowing constraint is the 
model’s mechanism for making entrepreneurial decisions and profits dependent on 
household balance sheets. 
 Capital is not owned by firms, so in effect entrepreneurial households face a 
requirement that working capital must be financed through borrowing. However, 
consider a special case in which ℎ = 0, 5 > 0, and the rental rate on capital is not 




household’s financial wealth is held as physical capital, so entrepreneurial capital is 
not rented but owned by the entrepreneurial household. Therefore, the working 
capital constraint setup differs from entrepreneurial ownership of capital when there 
is an intermediation cost (credit spread) or when the household owns housing. 
Housing is a versatile asset, since the ability to borrow against it to rent capital makes 
housing similar to owning productive capital. 
 The borrowing constraint given by (3) may be thought of as a reduced-form 
simplification of borrowing conditions motivated by agency problems. For example, 
Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) derive a capital rental constraint from an exogenous 
default recovery parameter faced by banks along with a no-default condition. In the 
event of default, banks can recover a fixed portion of entrepreneurial profits along 
with wealth deposited with the financial intermediary; the bank derives the borrowing 
constraint by choosing the maximum amount of loaned capital at which the household 
prefers repayment to default. The resulting level of permissible capital rental is 
increasing in household wealth and entrepreneurial productivity. My simplified 
borrowing constraint has similar properties except that it discards the role of 
productivity in the constraint for tractability purposes. Further, I apply the maximum 
loan-to-value parameter 8 ≤ 1 to housing (but not liquid wealth) based on the notion 
that liquid wealth is relatively easy for the bank to seize and use while foreclosed 
housing is characterized by costs and risks that render it less valuable as loan security 
(from the bank’s perspective). In my specification, the borrowing constraint works 






 Entrepreneurs and the corporate sector produce the same final good which can 
be consumed, traded for housing, or (via the financial intermediary) used as 
productive capital. All firms rent capital from the financial intermediary at rate 1; 
and hire labor from a common labor market at wage 4. Capital is rented, utilized, and 
returned to the financial intermediary within the period, so it is not an intertemporal 
decision for firms. Capital depreciates at rate <;. 
 The corporate sector consists of a representative firm with the following 
constant returns to scale technology: 
 =% = >%?%@A% @  , (4) 
where B ∈ (0,1), >% is (unchanging) corporate productivity, which will be normalized 
to 1, and ?% and A% are corporate capital and labor demand, respectively. Corporate 
production does not involve fixed costs. 
 Entrepreneurs are households that choose to operate their decreasing returns to 
scale productive technology: 
 CD = E7FGH  , (5) 
where I ∈ (0,1), J ∈ (0,1), and I + J < 1. Capital demand is given by 7 and labor 
demand is given by G. All households receive an idiosyncratic entrepreneurial 
productivity draw E from a K51L(M, N) distribution. Household productivity is 
persistent: each period, there is probability O that the household keeps its productivity 
draw from the previous period. Households observe their entrepreneurial productivity 
before making their occupational decision. For the sake of generality, entrepreneurs 




I set P = 0.16 The state variable Q tracks entrepreneurial entry and is defined as 
follows: 
Q = R0 if the household was an entrepreneur in the previous period1 if the household was a worker in the previous period  
 Financial Sector 
 A representative financial intermediary borrows from savers at interest rate 1 
and uses the savings to finance loans, capital, and rental housing. The financial 
intermediary owns all of the economy’s capital and rental housing and therefore 
suffers depreciation losses. Additionally, conversion of savings into capital and 
loanable funds is subject to an exogenous marginal intermediation cost a. Technology 
for the production of capital, the allocation of loans, and the acquisition of rental 
housing is linear. 
 
3.2: Recursive Competitive Equilibrium 
 
 Define b(Q, 5, ℎ, E) as the distribution of households over the state space. Then 
 c c c b(Q, 5, ℎ, E)dEdℎd5 = 1e*6

f  . 
 The distribution of households over the state space follows the law of motion 
b(Q, 5, ℎ, E) = Ψhb(Q, 5, ℎ, E)i 
where Ψ depends on optimal policy rules 5 and ℎ; the law of motion for E, given by 
E = R E with probability OE~K(E) with probability 1 − O  ; 
                                                 
16 Setup costs are likely significant for new entrepreneurs. However, as Buera, Kaboski, and Shin 
(2011) note, setup costs increase the influence of borrowing constraints. Since setup costs are difficult 




and the law of motion for Q, given by 
Q = R1 if (Q, 5, ℎ, E) = 00 if (Q, 5, ℎ, E) = 1 . 
 Consider the following descriptions of model aggregates. lf  is the total 
savings of households with positive financial assets (savers), while lm  is the total 
borrowing of households with negative financial assets (so lm < 0). n and op are 
total housing demand among buyers and renters, respectively, and n6qr is the total 
owned housing stock among households that adjusted their housing holdings. s is 
total nondurable consumption. Af is total labor supply (i.e., the number of households 
that are workers), and AD is the total labor demand among entrepreneurs. ?D and =D 
are entrepreneurial capital demand and output, respectively. tD is the total number of 
startups. These aggregates are constructed using state variables, policy functions, and 
the household distribution b(Q, 5, ℎ, E), and I define them in detail in Appendix A1.1. 
 Assume that =% > 0. The representative corporate firm maximizes profits with 
the following first-order conditions: 
 1; = B>% u?%A%v@  (6) 
 4 = (1 − B)>% u?%A%v@  . (7) 
 This implies the following equilibrium relationship between the wage and the 
capital rental rate: 
 4 = (1 − B)>% w 1;B>%x
@@  . (8) 




 Households maximize the value of lifetime utility, which is given by 
y(Q, 5, ℎ, E) = maxD∈{,}{yD(Q, 5, ℎ, E), yD(Q, 5, ℎ, E)} 
where yD(Q, 5, ℎ, E) is the value of being a worker and yD(Q, 5, ℎ, E) is the value 
of being an entrepreneur. 
 Households that choose to be workers ( = 0) solve the following problem: 
yD(Q, 5, ℎ, E) = max%~,6*~,M~{(, ) + Oy(1, 5, ℎ, E) + (1 − O)ey(1, 5, ℎ, E)} 
subject to 
  + 5 + 0(ℎ − ℎ) + pD1*0 + **20ℎ ≤ 4 + (1 + 16)5 (9) 
 0 ≤ 5 + 80ℎ ,  
where pD indicates housing tenure with 
 pD = R1 if ℎ = 0 (renter)0 if ℎ =  (owner) (10) 
and _(ℎ ≠ ℎ) indicates housing adjustment with 
 ** = -1 if ℎ ≠ ℎ0 if ℎ = ℎ . (11) 
The Q variable in the worker’s value function yD(Q, 5, ℎ, E) is trivial, since Q does 
not affect the worker’s choices. The definition of pD given by (10) provides 
mutually exclusive possible values if the housing utility term satisfies the Inada 
condition, as in my specification (therefore  > 0). 
 For households that own housing (ℎ > 0), the term  in the utility function is 
predetermined. Households that hold the same amount of owned housing from period 




 Households that choose to be entrepreneurs ( = 1) solve the following 
problem: 
yD(Q, 5, ℎ, E) = max%~,6*~,M~;~,~
{(, ) + Oy(0, 5, ℎ, E) + (1 − O)ey(0, 5, ℎ, E)} 
subject to 
  + 5 + 0(ℎ − ℎ) + pD1*0 + **20ℎ
≤ E7FGH − 1;7 − 4G − QP + (1 + 16)5 (12) 
 7 ≤ 5 + 80ℎ ,  
where pD and ** are defined in (10) and (11), respectively, and P is the fixed 
entry cost paid by new entrepreneurs (Q = 1). Again,  is predetermined for 
homeowners (ℎ > 0). In general the household policy functions must be obtained 
numerically. However, the entrepreneurial capital and labor demand functions can be 
solved analytically using Kuhn-Tucker conditions. First, assume that the borrowing 
constraint does not bind. Then the entrepreneurial profit maximization problem is 
independent of both the household’s state and the household’s other decisions. The 
first-order conditions are: 
 7(E; 1;, 4) = 1;IE uJE4 v
HH 
H  F H
 (13) 
 G(E; 1;, 4) =  4EJ7(E; 1;, 4)F H  , (14) 
where 7 and G indicate unconstrained capital and labor demand, respectively. The 
unconstrained factor demand functions depend only on the wage 4, the capital rental 




of capital demand, which simplifies the intuition in the constrained case. Now 
suppose that the borrowing constraint binds. Then labor demand still directly depends 
only on factor prices, productivity, and capital demand, but capital demand is given 
by the binding constraint. Hence, actual capital and labor demand functions are given 
by 
 




H  F H if 7(E, 1;, 0) ≤ 5 + J0ℎ
5 + J0ℎ otherwise
 (15) 
 G(E, 5, ℎ; 1;4, 0) =  4EJ7(E, 5, ℎ; 1;, 4, 0)F H . (16) 
That is, capital demand equals its unconstrained level if that level is consistent with 
the borrowing constraint. Labor demand depends indirectly on the borrowing 
constraint because it is a function of capital demand. When the borrowing constraint 
binds, both factor demand functions depend on household assets, the house price, and 
the loan-to-value ratio. The constraint on capital and labor demand implies a 
constraint on both entrepreneurial output and profits any time the entrepreneurs’ 
optimal scale is larger than that allowed by the borrowing limit. This is the key 
mechanism for this model: a household with little financial and housing wealth can 
receive a large productivity draw but be restricted to operating at a scale that is well 
below the unconstrained optimal level, or may even choose to be a worker instead. 
 Taking the cost of funds 1 as given, the financial intermediary solves the 
following profit maximization problem: 





?% + ?D − lm + 0op = lf , 
that is, the financial intermediary lends out the total amount of household savings, 
dividing it between physical capital, loanable funds, and rental housing. Here I have 
defined 1 as the rate at which the financial intermediary borrows from saving 
households. The first-order conditions corresponding to the intermediary’s choice 
variables are: 
?% , ?D ∶  1; = 1 + <; + a (17) lm ∶  16 = 1 + a (for borrowers) (18) op ∶  1* = 1 (19) 
Thus, the intermediation cost manifests itself as a credit spread with respect to the 
interest rate paid to savers. Agents that borrow from the bank must pay the basic 
interest rate along with extra payment to cover relevant depreciation and 
intermediation costs. Note that from the households’ perspective, 16 is defined as 
follows: 
16 = - 1 if 5 ≥ 01 + a if 5 < 0 
It is simple to show that the financial intermediary, while owned by the households, 
has zero profits (see Appendix A1.1). 
 In addition to the set of policy functions that solve the household’s problem, 
equilibrium requires the following. The financial market clears: 
 ?% + ?D + 0op = lf + lm . (20) 




 A% + AD = Af . (21) 
Define nf as the exogenously set supply of housing. The housing market clears: 
 n + op = nf . (22) 
The aggregate resource constraint holds: 
 =D + =% − 20n6qr − a(?% + ?D − lm) − tDP
= s + (?% − (1 − <;)?%) + h?D − (1 − <;)i (23) 
where tD is the number of startups.17 The resource constraint simply requires that 
consumption and investment be equal to total output after the costs of frictions—
credit intermediation costs, housing adjustment costs, and firm entry costs. Housing 
investment does not appear in the resource constraint because the aggregate housing 
stock does not change over time. While it is uncommon for prices to appear in 
aggregate resource constraints, observe that the house price 0 enters here because 
housing adjustment involves the sale or purchase of housing materials. The house 
price is the rate at which output goods can be exchange for housing materials. Hence, 
a reduction in 0 makes agents wealthier in aggregate by reducing the costs of 
adjusting house holdings, leaving more units of output available for consumption and 
investment. A model with an actual construction sector may not have this property. 
 The stationary distribution is characterized by equilibrium prices and 
allocations with the distribution law of motion at a fixed point: 
b⋆ = Ψhb⋆(Q, 5, ℎ, E)i . 
 
                                                 





Section 4: Calibration 
 
I take several parameter values from existing literature; these are reported in 
Table 1.1. Many are standard values. I calibrate other parameters to match key 
moments from U.S. data. These are reported on Table 1.2. 
 
Table 1.1: Literature-based Parameters 
Parameter   Source 
Relative risk aversion, nondurables $% 1.5 BKS (2011) 
Housing adjustment cost 2 0.05 I&P (2013) 
Capital depreciation <; 0.06 BKS (2011) 
Entrep. output-to-capital elasticity I 0.299 BKS (2011) 
Entrep. output-to-labor elasticity J 0.491 BKS (2011) 
Corporate output capital share B 0.33 Quadrini (2000) 
BKS: Buera, Kaboski, and Shin. IP: Iacoviello and Pavan. BEA: Bureau of Economic 
Analysis tables, mean of residential structures. 
 
Table 1.2: Moment-based Calibration 
Parameter   Moment Model Data Source 
Discount factor  0.95 1 0.04 0.04 Standard 
Housing supply nf 2.5 Avg. house size 2.5 2.5 AHS 2007 
Housing taste ' 0.20 Housing/GDP 1.8 1.8 FF 2006 
RRA, housing $* 1.93 Pop. >4000 sq ft 0.10 0.05 AHS 2007 
Rent penalty ( 0.99 Share renters 0.32 0.32 AHS 2007 
Ent. TFP scale  M 1.18 AD A⁄  0.176 0.176 LBD 2006 
Ent. TFP shape N 7.59 Gmin Gmax⁄  0.05 0.04 LBD 2006 
TFP persistence O 0.78 Astartups A⁄  0.03 0.03 BDS 2006 
LTV ratio  8 0.92 Max LTV ratio 0.92 0.92 Kalita (2011) 
Lending cost a 0.009 Credit spread 0.009 0.009 BofA/ML 
 
The discount factor  is chosen to obtain an interest rate of 4 percent, a 
standard value in the literature. Other calibrated parameters are chosen such that the 
model resembles the U.S. economy around the year 2006, the peak of both house 
prices and startup activity in the U.S. The 2007 American Housing Survey (AHS) 




which the AHS exists). As mentioned above, I assume that housing exists in units of 
500 square feet, so 2.5 housing units is 2,500 square feet. Since the economy has a 
population normalized to one, an average house size of 2,500 square feet is equivalent 
to an aggregate housing supply of the same size. Hence, I set nf = 2.5. 
Parameters governing housing demand are calibrated as follows. I calibrate  ' 
so that the model produces a realistic value for the economy’s owned housing stock 
(which directly relates to collateral value); I target the ratio of the value of housing to 
GDP, which was about 1.8 in the first quarter of 2006. The numerator is the total 
(nominal) market value of all real estate held by households and nonprofit 
organizations, reported by the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds data; the denominator 
is nominal GDP. Since the Flow of Funds measure does not include rental properties 
owned by businesses, in the model I define this ratio using owned housing only. 
Setting ' = 0.20 yields a perfect match for this ratio. I choose $* to match an aspect 
of the housing distribution, in particular the proportion of households living in houses 
larger than 4,000 square feet. An unrealistically large share of households living in 
large houses would result in too much collateral in the economy. The quantity is 
given by the 2007 AHS, which reports house size data in 500 square foot increments 
(as in the model). This share in the data is about 5 percent; setting $* = 1.93 yields a 
share of 10 percent in the model. I calibrate the utility penalty for renting, given by (, 
so that the proportion of households that rent approximately matches the U.S. 
rentership rate, which the AHS reports as about 32 percent in 2007. Setting ( = 0.99 
yields a perfect match of the rentership rate. In general, the model matches the 




The parameters of the K51L(M, N) distribution for E are chosen to match 
the firm size distribution. While there is no objective definition of “entrepreneur” in 
the data, the model is motivated by credit constraints that are faced by young firms 
and other firms that have close ties to their owners’ personal finances. As such, in the 
data I describe a firm as an entrepreneur if it is less than six years old or is legally 
organized as a sole proprietorship. The scale parameter M is chosen to match the 
share of employment accounted for by entrepreneurs, which was 17.6 percent in 2006 
according to the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). Setting M = 1.18 achieves 
a perfect match. Since the driver of heterogeneity in the model is E, the shape 
parameter N is used to ensure a wide distribution of firms. The relevant model 
moment is the ratio of the smallest to the largest entrepreneur in terms of 
employment. To avoid extreme outliers, the corresponding data moment is the ratio of 
the employment of the 5th percentile entrepreneur to the 95th percentile entrepreneur 
from the 2006 LBD. This ratio in the data is 0.04; setting N = 7.59 results in the 
model producing a ratio of 0.05. The model matches the firm distribution quite well. 
To target the share of employment accounted for by startups I use the 
productivity persistence parameter O. This parameter governs firm churn in the model 
because it partly determines how many existing worker households receive new 
productivity draws that could induce them into entrepreneurship. In the 2006 
Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS), startups account for 3 percent of employment. 
Setting O = 0.78 achieves this share in the model. 
The remaining parameters are the loan-to-value ratio 8 and the intermediation 




from Kalita (2011), which reports median loan-to-value ratios on new mortgages. The 
baseline value for the intermediation cost a, which determines the exogenous credit 
spread, is based on the average of the Bank of America Merrill Lynch US Corporate 
Master Option-Adjusted Spread for the year 2006. In what follows, my policy 
experiments consist of varying a, 8, the housing taste parameter ', and the housing 
supply nf. 
The solution method is described in Appendix A1.2. 
 
Section 5: Results 
5.1: Main Experiments 
 
I use the model described above to conduct four main experiments which are 
described concisely on Table 1.3 (the “Baseline” scenario is the model as calibrated 
to 2006-2007 data above). The purpose of these exercises is to compare the effects of 
a housing crisis and a financial crisis on entrepreneurial activity. I consider three 
different “housing crisis” scenarios. 
 
Table 1.3: Stationary State Scenarios 
Scenario ' nf 8 a 
“Baseline” 0.20 2.5 0.92 0.009 
“Taste” 0.14 2.5 0.92 0.009 
“Supply” 0.20 3.2 0.92 0.009 
“LTV” 0.20 2.5 0.78 0.009 
Financial crisis  0.20 2.5 0.92 0.028 





In the first housing crisis scenario, I reduce housing tastes to induce a lower 
equilibrium house price. In particular, I change the housing taste parameter ' from 
0.20 (the baseline value calibrated above) to 0.14. I choose this value to produce a 
housing-to-GDP ratio of 1.2, corresponding to Flow of Funds data for the first quarter 
of 2011 (all other parameters are left as in Tables 1.1 and 1.2). This scenario is called 
“Taste” in the tables that follow. 
In the second housing crisis scenario, I induce a lower equilibrium house price 
by expanding the exogenously set housing supply nf. I increase nf by the amount 
necessary to obtain the same lower house price as that obtained in the Taste 
experiment, leaving all other model parameters as in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. This requires 
changing nf from 2.5 to 3.2; in other words, it requires that I expand the average 
house size by 700 square feet or 28 percent. Note that this is equivalent to a partial 
equilibrium experiment in which the house price is chosen manually. This scenario is 
called “Supply” in the tables that follow. 
In the third housing crisis scenario, I change the permissible loan-to-value 
ratio parameter 8 from 0.92 to 0.78; the latter value corresponds to 2011 data from 
Kalita (2011). Again, all other parameters are left as in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. The loan-
to-value ratio affects the household borrowing constraint in the same way as the 
house price, determining the collateral value of owned housing. This scenario is 
called “LTV” in the tables that follow. The concept that unifies the three housing 
crisis scenarios is the notion of a reduction in the collateral value of housing. 








Table 1.4: Results: Housing Crisis 
 Baseline Taste Supply LTV 
q 1.68 1.15 1.15 1.65 
r 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
w 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 
Output 1.74 1.73 1.73 1.74 
Entrep. output 0.39 0.35 0.37 0.38 
Entrep. employment 0.166 0.147 0.158 0.161 
Entrep. share 0.176 0.155 0.167 0.170 
Startup employment 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.027 
Startup share 0.030 0.026 0.028 0.029 
Entrep. ownership rate 0.95 0.96 1.00 0.74 
Worker ownership rate 0.66 0.64 0.98 0.52 
Aggregate savings 5.94 5.70 4.85 6.36 
Savings/GDP ratio 4.49 3.84 2.80 5.32 
Housing/GDP ratio 1.80 1.20 2.08 1.58 
Constrained entrepreneurs 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.87 
Renters 0.32 0.34 0.02 0.46 
 
Observe that the reduction in the taste for housing causes a decline of the 
stationary state house price of about 32 percent. Likewise, the S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. 
National Home Price Index shows a 32 percent decline across the calibration period 
(from the first quarter of 2006 to the first quarter of 2011). The expansion of the 
housing supply obtains the same house price drop because it was calibrated to do so. 
In both scenarios, entrepreneurial activity is significantly below the baseline scenario, 
as hypothesized. Table 1.5 compares entrepreneurs’ and startups’ share of 
employment in the model—in particular, the switch from the baseline scenario to the 




columns corresponding with the initial 2006 state are calibrated to match each other, 
but other columns report model and data shares that are endogenous model results. 
 
Table 1.5: Model Results Compared to Data (“Supply” scenario) 
 Initial (2006) Terminal (2011) Change (%) Portion 
explained  Model Data Model Data Model Data 
Entrep. share 0.176 0.176 0.167 0.141 -5.1 -19.9 26% 
Startup share 0.030 0.030 0.028 0.022 -6.7 -26.7 25% 
Entrepreneur data from LBD; startup data from BDS. 
 
As Table 1.5 shows, the housing crisis driven by supply expansion (or, 
equivalently, through partial equilibrium) can account for about one quarter of the 
decline in the share of activity accounted for by entrepreneurs and the share of 
activity accounted for by startups. The taste shock scenario can account for 60 percent 
and 50 percent of the declines in entrepreneurs’ and startups’ shares, respectively. 
The LTV scenario can account for 17 percent and 13 percent.  
Changes in employment levels (as opposed to shares) are also empirically 
plausible. From 2006 to 2011 the level of entrepreneurial employment in the LBD fell 
from about 21 million to about 16 million, a 24 percent drop. The housing crisis 
scenarios consist of entrepreneurial employment drops ranging from 3 to 11 percent, 
accounting for between one sixth and (almost) one half of the decline of 
entrepreneurial employment in the data. From 2006 to 2011 the level of startup 
employment in the BDS fell from about 560,000 to about 400,000, a 29 percent drop. 
The housing crisis scenarios generate startup employment drops again ranging from 3 
percent to 11 percent. Broadly speaking, the housing crisis has a significant amount 




entrepreneurs who are at the borrowing constraint (“constrained entrepreneurs”) rises 
in the taste shock and housing supply scenarios. It actually falls in the loan-to-value 
scenario, suggesting that entry deterrence is a key mechanism for reducing 
entrepreneurial activity. 
In general, homeownership rates are higher among entrepreneurs than among 
workers, an outcome that is qualitatively (but not quantitatively) consistent with the 
data.18 The rise in rentership rates produced by the taste shock and loan-to-value 
scenarios is also quantitatively consistent with the Great Recession experience, 
though the housing supply scenario has the opposite effect of eliminating renting 
almost entirely.19 This scenario illustrates the value of considering multiple sources of 
housing collateral tightening. 
The model generally produces too much aggregate savings: the ratio of 
savings to output in the baseline scenario is 5.94, while the corresponding number in 
the data is 3.47.20 If anything, this biases the results against my key mechanism, since 
savings loosen collateral constraints. 
The housing crisis experiments have little effect on the interest rate, the wage, 
and output. While entrepreneurial output falls, corporate output rises to compensate. 
There is no aggregate demand shock in the model, and since the corporate sector 
produces the same good as entrepreneurs, total production need not fall. In that sense 
                                                 
18 In the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances, the homeownership rates for entrepreneurs and workers 
are 82 percent and 67 percent, respectively. 
19 The American Housing Survey reports an increase in the rentership rate from 32 percent in 2006 to 
39 percent in 2011. 
20 This is based on Flow of Funds data for the first quarter of 2006. The numerator for this ratio is total 




the results for entrepreneurial employment can be thought of as lower bounds, since 
they occur within a generally healthy economy. In the absence of a healthy corporate 
sector to provide compensatory labor demand, it is likely that the aggregate labor 
market would suffer from the drop in entrepreneurship. Quantifying this next step in 
the causal chain is an important task for future research. 
Recall that the collateral constraint is given by 7 ≤ 5 + 80ℎ, so the loan-to-
value ratio enters the collateral constraint in the same way as the house price; but the 
decline in the multiplier on housing is different in the two experiments. Table 1.6 
reports the value of 08 for the housing crisis scenarios. Observe that the collateral 
multiplier falls more in the taste shock and supply shock scenarios than in the loan-to-
value scenario, which partly explains why entrepreneurial activity falls less in the 
latter than in the two former experiments. 
 
Table 1.6: Collateral Value of Housing 
 Baseline Taste Supply LTV 80 1.55 1.06 1.06 1.29 
 
I now turn to the “financial crisis” scenario, which consists of an exogenous 
increase in the credit spread, reflecting increased frictions to credit supply. In reality 
credit spreads are endogenous, but in the model experiments I abstract from the 
endogeneity to focus on the specific channel leading from financial market turmoil to 
business activity. In the financial crisis scenario, I change the credit spread a from 
0.009 (or 0.9 percentage points, the baseline value corresponding to 2006) to 0.028 
(or 2.8 percentage points). The latter value is the average level of the Bank of 




In a fourth experiment, I combine several parameter changes to create a 
simultaneous housing and financial crisis. In particular, I combine the “Taste” 
experiment, the “LTV” experiment, and the high-spread experiment. 
Table 1.7 describes key model outcomes for the financial crisis scenario and 
the combination Taste/LTV/Spread scenario. 
 
Table 1.7: Results: Financial Crisis and Combination 
 Baseline Fin. Crisis Combination 
q 1.68 1.40 0.95 
r 0.04 0.04 0.04 
w 1.16 1.07 1.07 
Output 1.74 1.61 1.61 
Entrep. output 0.39 0.38 0.35 
Entrep. employment 0.166 0.173 0.159 
Entrep. share 0.176 0.183 0.168 
Startup employment 0.028 0.028 0.026 
Startup share 0.030 0.030 0.027 
Entrep. ownership rate 0.95 0.94 0.80 
Worker ownership rate 0.66 0.63 0.61 
Aggregate savings 5.94 4.27 4.63 
Savings/GDP ratio 4.49 4.77 3.42 
Housing/GDP ratio 1.80 1.54 1.02 
Constrained entrepreneurs 0.89 0.87 0.87 
Renters 0.32 0.35 0.38 
Entrepreneurs 0.055 0.057 0.053 
 
The financial crisis experiment produces results which differ starkly from the 
housing crisis scenarios. Recall that both entrepreneurs and the corporate sector are 
subject to the exogenous credit spread. The increase in the spread results in a 7 
percent decline in output. The interest rate and wages both fall (the former by an 
amount obscured by rounding), along with household savings. Thus, the financial 




Measures of entrepreneurship show significant increases under the high-
spread scenario. To understand this, recall from the model that the entrepreneurial 
decision is heavily dependent on factor prices. The cost of capital rental includes the 
interest rate and the spread, while the wage acts both as the cost of hired labor and the 
opportunity cost of being an entrepreneur. So both corporate and entrepreneurial 
profits depend on factor prices, but only entrepreneurship is associated with the wage-
as-opportunity-cost channel. The high-spread scenario is associated with a labor 
market that is less friendly to workers, which results in lower wages in this model, 
making entrepreneurship more attractive. Figure 1.6 illustrates this concept by 
showing the minimum productivity draw that is necessary to nudge a household into 
choosing entrepreneurship, plotted against household wealth, for several of the 
scenarios described above. Relative to the baseline, the taste shock and loan-to-value 
scenarios involve high thresholds for low levels of wealth, while the financial crisis 
scenario reduces the threshold. 
The high-spread scenario illustrates a central claim of this study: supply-side 
financial frictions that affect all firms cannot explain the relative decline of 
entrepreneurial activity that occurred in the U.S. economy prior to and during the 
Great Recession. A financial crisis can have devastating effects on the economy 
generally, reducing output and wages, but it does not uniquely harm entrepreneurs 
and can even boost entrepreneurship by creating opportunistic entrepreneurs who 
want to escape an unhealthy labor market (these would include “entrepreneurs of 
necessity,” though the model does not include unemployment). The key to explaining 




and business finances for entrepreneurs, which makes entrepreneurial activity heavily 
dependent on the value of household assets. Hence a housing crisis can reduce 
entrepreneurship, but a financial crisis cannot. In the next section I relax the 
assumption that corporate and entrepreneurial firms face the same credit spread. 
 
Figure 1.6: Productivity Thresholds for Entrepreneurship 
 
 
Since the Great Recession involved a decline in both housing prices and the 
loan-to-value ratio as well as a heightened credit spread, the final experimental 
scenario involves a combination of the low house price, the low loan-to-value ratio, 
and the high credit spread. Unsurprisingly, the results of this experiment resemble a 
compromise between housing crisis and financial crisis. Output falls dramatically, 




mechanism for increasing entrepreneurship is offset by tighter borrowing constraints 
on entrepreneurs which affect the extensive margin as well as firm scale. Hence, 
entrepreneurial activity falls relative to the baseline scenario, but it does not fall as 
much as in the taste shock or housing supply scenarios. Compared with the baseline 
scenario, the combination scenario still explains about a quarter of the decline in 
entrepreneurs’ share and about 40 percent of the decline in startups’ share seen in the 
data. In general, the experiment further confirms the importance of the housing 
collateral channel. 
5.2: Robustness Check: Credit Spread 
 
 A key conclusion of the main analysis in this paper is that a housing crisis can 
significantly reduce entrepreneurship, while a general financial crisis fails to do so 
(and can even increase entrepreneurial activity). The main driver of this result is the 
fact that entrepreneurial activity is irrevocably tied to household balance sheets, while 
corporate firms are independent of their owners’ personal assets. Since the credit 
supply friction—modeled here as an intermediation cost that gives rise to a credit 
spread—applies equally to all firms, it does not disproportionately affect 
entrepreneurs directly. In reality, it is likely that entrepreneurs and corporate firms 
face differential frictions even on the credit supply side. In terms of my model, this 
notion can be operationalized by allowing entrepreneurs and corporate firms to face a 
different credit spread. 
 In this general equilibrium experiment, I revise the model to include an 




spread, that applies only to entrepreneurs. This results in entrepreneurs facing a 
higher capital rental rate than the corporate sector. In particular, the capital rental 
rates are now as follows: 
1%; = <; + a + 1 
1D; = <; + a + aD + 1 
where 1%; is the rental rate faced by the corporate sector, 1D; is the rental rate faced by 
entrepreneurs, and aD is the extra intermediation cost or risk premium that applies 
only to entrepreneurs. I can determine the potential of this difference in credit supply 
terms to explain the empirical reduction in entrepreneurship by choosing a value for 
aD such that, in general equilibrium, entrepreneurship falls to the level seen in the 
housing taste/house price decline experiment described above (“Taste”). Table 1.8 
reports results from this experiment under the column labeled “Spread aD; results 
from several previously discussed experiments are also reported for comparison. 
 
Table 1.8: Entrepreneur-Specific Credit Spread 
 Baseline Taste Fin. crisis Spread aD aD  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 a  0.009 0.009 0.028 0.028 
q 1.68 1.15 1.40 1.40 
r 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
w 1.16 1.16 1.07 1.07 
Output 1.74 1.73 1.61 1.61 
Entrep. output 0.39 0.35 0.38 0.32 
Entrep. employment 0.166 0.147 0.173 0.147 
Entrep. share 0.176 0.155 0.183 0.155 
Startup employment 0.028 0.025 0.028 0.025 
Startup share 0.030 0.026 0.030 0.026 
 
 As Table 1.8 reports, the scenario in which entrepreneurs face an additional 




common-spread scenario. As targeted, entrepreneurial activity matches the low level 
of the housing taste/low-house price scenario. The additional spread required to 
achieve this target is aD = 0.02. In other words, a credit supply friction can generate 
the same reduction in entrepreneurship as the low-house price experiment provided 
that the increase in the credit spread faced by entrepreneurs is 2 percentage points or 
105 percent larger than the increase in the credit spread faced by the corporate sector. 
Running the experiment with an entrepreneurial employment share target based on 
the housing supply shock scenario yields aD = 0.012, or 1.2 percentage points. Data 
on lending by commercial banks by loan size class suggests that such a large 
difference in the spread increase between small and large firms is implausible.21 
 
Section 6: Conclusion 
 
 I review evidence consistent with a relationship between home values and 
entrepreneurship, with a key mechanism being the dependence of entrepreneurial 
activity on housing collateral. I construct a model characterized by rich financial 
frictions, a housing sector, and entrepreneurship. The model suggests that the 
disproportionate decline in entrepreneurial activity prior to and during the Great 
Recession was more likely to have been caused by the housing crisis than the broad 
financial crisis. For a financial crisis to reduce entrepreneurship as much as a housing 
                                                 
21 The Federal Reserve Board reports size-weighted interest rate averages by size class in its Survey of 
Terms of Business Lending. Consider the interest rates, averaged annually for 2005-2011, for small 
loans (less than $100,000) and large loans (greater than $10 million). The difference between these 
ranges from 1.99 to 2.47 percentage points. In other words, the spread for small loans increases by less 
than 0.5 percentage points more than the spread for large loans, compared with 1.2 to 2 percentage 
points in the model. The results are similar if “large loans” are defined as being between $1 million 




crisis, entrepreneurs must face an increase in their credit spread that is 1.2 to 2.0 
percentage points higher than the change in the spread faced by corporate firms. 
Recessions associated with large house price declines are likely to be characterized by 
disproportionate reductions in entrepreneurial activity, with the potential for 
quantitatively significant implications for job creation (though I do not model this). 
This is a plausible mechanism for which there is growing evidence in the literature. 
 In the present study I have defined “housing crisis” and “financial crisis” in 
specific, narrow ways: A housing crisis is a contraction in the collateral value of 
housing (through a drop in either house prices or loan-to-value ratios), while a 
financial crisis is a positive, exogenous shock to credit spreads. In reality, these 
concepts are broad and interrelated. In the Great Recession, the housing crisis had 
large effects on banks and was a key driver of the financial crisis. Both credit spreads 
and loan-to-value ratios are equilibrium objects in reality. For my purposes, though, it 
is important to model the financial sector parsimoniously to allow for clean 
comparisons of the effects of various types of credit stress on entrepreneurs. 
 With the caveat that this model necessarily simplifies key aspects of the 
financial sector, the model results may be thought of as a lower bound on the effects 
of housing collateral shocks on entrepreneurial job creation and of the effects of 
distressed entrepreneurs on the broader economy. One reason for this is that, in the 
model, the house price acts as a technology for converting output to housing, and a 
decline in the house price leaves more output available for other uses. This can boost 
consumer demand, offsetting the pressures on entrepreneurial firms. Additionally, the 




Reallocation of factors from entrepreneurs to the corporate sector is frictionless, so 
the corporate sector can compensate for low entrepreneurial activity and labor 
demand to allow households to continue to consume at high levels. The Great 
Recession, on the other hand, was characterized by stress on large firms associated 
with, for example, credit supply restrictions and low aggregate demand. In reality and 
my model, these effects can indirectly boost entrepreneurship through a labor market 
channel, but in reality the resulting increase in entrepreneurship is not likely to be 
characterized by the kind of high-growth entrants that drive job creation. Overall the 
model suggests that periods characterized by significant declines in home values are 
likely to be accompanied by lower entrepreneurial activity. More broadly, the close 
link between entrepreneurial credit access and the personal characteristics and assets 
of entrepreneurs themselves is important for understanding the relationship between 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
 A key insight of the firm dynamics research agenda is that the composition 
and behavior of individual firms exist in a feedback relationship with the aggregate 
economy. This chapter describes an economic mechanism through which aggregate 
first-moment conditions affect the choices of firms, and these choices have 
consequences for aggregate second-moment conditions. In particular, aggregate 
productivity drives firms’ decisions about market participation, and the number of 
markets in which firms participate influences the volatility of firm-level and 
aggregate outcomes. The model described here has implications for an ongoing 
debate in macroeconomics about uncertainty and the business cycle.  
Firm-level risk is countercyclical. Bloom (2009) and an extensive literature 
that followed have analyzed how exogenous changes in uncertainty (or second-
moment shocks) can be key drivers of the business cycle. In this chapter, we evaluate 
the possibility that causality operates in the opposite direction. Our hypothesis is that 
part of the observed change in measured firm-level risk over the business cycle is an 
endogenous response to first-moment shocks. 
 We propose a theoretical model in which firms endogenously determine the 




specific demand shocks.1 As long as the market-specific shocks are not perfectly 
correlated, the endogenous dynamics of market exposure imply changes in firm-level 
volatility. A continuum of competitive firms face stochastic market demands, differ in 
their level of idiosyncratic productivity, and face an aggregate productivity shock. 
They can participate in many markets by incurring selling expenses before demand 
shocks are realized. Thus, these endogenous per-period sunk costs determine the pool 
of suppliers in each market. Incentives to expand are higher in good times (i.e., when 
aggregate productivity is high) than in bad times. Since broader market exposure 
results in lower firm-level volatility, the model captures the observed 
countercyclicality of firm-level risk (with a business cycle correlation ranging from    
-0.20 to -0.42 in the model versus -0.46 in the data).2 
We test the model in several dimensions and find that it is broadly consistent 
with the evidence. In order to do so, we work with novel data on market presence that 
link Compustat with the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Business Database 
(LBD). Though the firms in our model are risk neutral and lack any risk 
diversification objective, we find that they increase their revenues and diversify 
market-specific shocks by reaching more markets. The model is consistent with the 
procyclicality of measures of market exposure as well as the observed negative 
                                                 
1 We adopt a broad definition of “market” that applies to the market-product space, the market-location 
space, and a combination of the two. The empirical measures we use are intended to capture this broad 
definition of “market.” 
2 In the data, we follow Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2009) and measure firm-level idiosyncratic 
risk as the portion of growth in sales that cannot be explained by firm-level characteristics (such as age 
or size), industry, or year effects. The core data set for our empirical analysis is Compustat 
Fundamental (a sizeable panel of large, public U.S. firms). We construct two samples based on the 
core Compustat file: in one sample, we match Compustat Fundamental with Compustat Segment or 
“line of business” data; in another sample, we add matched firm-year data from the Longitudinal 
Business Database (LBD). See the following section as well as Appendix A2 for a detailed description 




elasticity of firm-level risk to measures of market expansion (that ranges from -7.5 
percent to -30.1 percent in the data and from -5.4 percent to -57.9 percent in the 
model). 
 A key prediction of the model is that the negative correlation between firm-
level risk and the business cycle is mostly driven by those firms that adjust the 
number of markets they operate over time, and that these firms happen to be, on 
average, larger than those firms that do not adjust. We test this prediction in the data 
and find that, consistent with the model, among firms that adjust market exposure in a 
given year, the correlation between firm-level risk and detrended GDP is between      
-0.311 and -0.422, depending on our market definition, while risk is acyclical for 
firms that do not adjust. Also consistent with our theory, when we split the sample of 
firms by size, we find that firm-level risk for large firms is countercyclical while it is 
not for small firms. In addition, the model presented here is consistent with the 
evidence at levels of aggregation other than the firm. First, it captures the fact that the 
dispersion of prices is countercyclical, as described by Berger and Vavra (2011). 
Second, it generates a countercyclical cross-sectional variance of plant-level 
productivity, as reported by Kehrig (2011). Finally, the model captures the fact that 
firm-level market exposure is procyclical. This has been documented by Broda and 
Weinstein (2010) based on the number of products per firm (derived from bar code 
data) over the cycle. We also find that the number of establishments per firm, another 
correlate of market exposure (especially for large firms), is procyclical. 
 This work brings together two relatively recent streams in the literature. The 




work by Bloom (2009) but also includes Arrellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2012); Bloom et 
al. (2012); Bachmann and Bayer (2013, 2014); Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno 
(2014); Chugh (2014); and Schaal (2012). In this literature, in contrast to our 
research, exogenous changes in volatility are key to generating business cycles. The 
second stream of literature is composed of studies that empirically analyze firm-level 
risk.3 Leahy and Whited (1996) analyze the relationship between firm-level risk and 
total market exposure and associated expenditures (after controlling for industry 
effects). Comin and Philippon (2006) document the increasing trend in firm-level 
volatility using Compustat, whereas Davis et al. (2007) show that the increase in 
firm-level risk is related to selection issues: the trend among privately held firms is 
actually downward, and the trend among publicly traded firms is driven in large part 
by cohort effects. 
 Our research is related to previous work analyzing the possibility of reverse 
causation between measured uncertainty and business cycles, which has already been 
described by Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims (2013) and Bachman and Bayer (2013, 
2014).4 We offer an alternative explanation to Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp 
(2006), Bachmann and Moscarini (2012), and Tian (2012). In Van Nieuwerburgh  
and Veldkamp (2006), procyclical learning about productivity generates the observed 
countercyclicality in firm-level volatility. In Bachmann and Moscarini (2012), 
downturns offer firms the opportunity to experiment and learn about their firm-
                                                 
3 Bachmann and Bayer (2013, 2014) show that if countercyclical firm-level risk is imposed as a second 
driving force and propagated through a wait-and-see mechanism in capital adjustment costs, it does not 
generate large aggregate fluctuations. 
4 Baker and Bloom (2013) address the issue of causality between first- and second-moment shocks 




specific demand function; that experimentation is the driver of additional volatility. In 
Tian (2012), periods of recession are accompanied by more risk-taking behavior at 
the firm level. In our model, positive first-moment shocks (aggregate TFP) enable 
firms to expand into more markets and expose firms to an increased number of 
market-specific shocks, reducing volatility through an intuitive diversification 
mechanism. More recently, Alessandria et al. (2014) study the role of exogenous 
first- and second-moment shocks to productivity as drivers of export dynamics and 
business cycles. 
 The notion that agents are exposed to a limited number of shocks and that, 
therefore, the law of large numbers does not apply is not unique to our work. Among 
the papers that use this assumption are Gabaix (2011), Acemoglu et al. (2012), and 
Koren and Tenreyro (2013). These papers argue that a small group of firms (as in 
Gabaix (2011)), a small number of sectors (as in Acemoglu et al. (2012)), or a small 
number of inputs (as in Koren and Tenreyro (2013)) are the drivers of aggregate 
volatility. We also build on the literature of multiproduct firms. For example, 
Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2010) allow for the endogenous expansion of the firm 
but do not consider the risk dimension of activity. Other related papers include 
Arkolakis (2010), Bloom et al. (2013), and Gourio and Rudanko (2014). Arkolakis 
(2010) develops a model of customer capital through advertisement, which is one of 
the elements of our intangible expenditures measure. Bloom et al. (2013) measure the 
effects of management expenditures (also within our definition of market exposure 
costs) on Indian firms, and Gourio and Rudanko (2014) develop a search model to 




 The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical facts 
regarding the risk distribution across firms and over the business cycle, using both 
Compustat and Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) data. Sections 3 and 4 describe a firm 
dynamics model with endogenous expansion and contraction of firms to capture the 
evidence presented in Section 2. Section 5 describes our calibration of the model to 
the distribution of firms in the United States and discusses the workings of the model. 
Section 6 presents the main results and compares the empirical evidence with model 
outcomes. Section 7 concludes the chapter. 
 
Section 2: Idiosyncratic Risk and Business Cycles 
 
In this section, we present evidence on the level of idiosyncratic risk and its 
cyclical components using our sample. These are well-known facts in the literature; 
specifically, firm-level risk is countercyclical and is related to firm size (larger firms 
tend to be less volatile). 
 Our main empirical facts come from Compustat and consist of annual 
accounting data for publicly listed U.S. firms.5 We use data from 1960 to 2012, 
consisting of an unbalanced panel of more than 8,400 firms for a total of 241,308 
firm-year observations. Compustat data are subject to selection bias as described by 
Davis et al. (2007). Because these firms are relatively larger and older than those that 
are not in Compustat, they are likely to be less volatile (see Castro, Clementi, and Lee 
(2014)). We try to address these differences by controlling for age and size and by 
                                                 
5 Appendix A2 provides a detailed description of our sample and the construction of key variables and 




using data from the KFS, which is based on a sample of small firms, to derive some 
of our results.6 The KFS provides a large panel of data on “young” businesses. Firms 
in the sample were founded in 2004 and have been tracked annually.7 This panel was 
created using a random sample from Dun and Bradstreet’s database of new 
businesses. The target population consisted of new businesses that were started in 
2004 in the United States and excluded any branch or subsidiary that was owned by 
an existing business or was inherited from someone else. The sample for the first 
survey consisted of 4,928 businesses. 
 As in Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2009), our proxy for firm-level 
idiosyncratic risk is the portion of sales growth that is not explained by industry 
effects, time effects, or firm characteristics associated with growth such as age or size 
(measured by employment).8,9 The first step toward obtaining our measure of 
idiosyncratic risk is to estimate the following equation: 
 ∆ ln(Q5Q r) = b  + <r + rln (Q¡E r) + ¢rln (5£ r) + ¤ r (1) 
                                                 
6 As we discuss in Section 6.4, we combine the Compustat Fundamental file with Compustat Segment 
data and the U.S. Census Bureau’s LBD to provide direct evidence on the mechanism in the model. 
While the LBD contains nearly every firm in the U.S. economy, it does not provide information on 
total revenues at the firm level (and, regardless, we only report results from LBD firms that have been 
matched to Compustat data). Other Census Bureau datasets, such as the Longitudinal Research 
Database (LRD), include revenue data but consist of limited samples for specific sectors only. These 
limitations prevented us from conducting the full experiment (all sectors, all firms) using only the LBD 
and/or the other data sources. 
7 Data are currently available for the years through 2008. See http://www.kauffman.org/kfs/ for a 
detailed description of the data and for the actual public-use microdata. 
8 Results are robust to a measure of idiosyncratic risk derived from total factor productivity (TFP) at 
the firm level. However, due to measurement issues associated with physical capital and factor shares 
in Compustat Fundamental and KFS data, our preferred firm-level volatility measure is based on sales 
growth. 
9 We are able to explicitly control for age in our Compustat sample; however, because all firms in the 




where ∆ln (Q5Q r) is the growth of real sales for firm ¡, in industry ¥, between 
period  and period  + 1. The variable b  is a firm fixed effect that accounts for 
unobserved persistent heterogeneity at the firm level (such as higher productivity or 
higher human capital of the entrepreneur). The variable <r denotes a full set of time- 
and industry-specific fixed effects.10 We allow for industry-specific size effects. The 
estimation of equation (1) is done using the fixed effects panel estimator with robust 
standard errors. In the KFS sample, we use revenues from sales of goods, services, or 
intellectual property as our measure of sales. In the Compustat Fundamental sample, 
our measure of sales is item #12, net sales.11 As is standard in the literature, size is 
defined in both samples as the number of employees. Age corresponds to the amount 
of time since a firm first appeared in the sample. 
 Once equation (1) is estimated, we can compute ¤ r, the pure idiosyncratic 
and unpredictable component of firms’ sales growth. Following Castro, Clementi, and 
MacDonald (2009), we proxy firm-level risk by ¤ r¢ .12 
 Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between detrended GDP and two different 
aggregate measures of idiosyncratic risk: the detrended log-median ¤ r¢  and the 
detrended cross-sectional standard deviation of ¤ r. 
                                                 
10 We use two-digit NAICS codes for firms in our KFS and Compustat samples. 
11 The sample selection and the definition of all variables used in the analysis are described in detail in 
Appendix A2. Nominal variables are deflated using two-digit sector-specific price deflators for value 
added from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
12 The estimated dispersion for the Compustat sample is consistent with the estimates in Castro, 
Clementi, and MacDonald (2009) and Castro, Clementi, and Lee (2014). Consistent with the estimates 
in Comin and Philippon (2006) and Davis et al. (2007), we find that idiosyncratic risk for publicly 




 The correlation between log-real GDP and the median ln (¤ r¢ ) and between 
log-real GDP and the cross sectional standard deviation of ¤ r (our estimated 
measures of idiosyncratic risk) equals -0.46 (p=0.00) and -0.23 (p-value=0.09), 
respectively. The 10 percent confidence intervals for these correlations are [-0.62,-
0.26] and [-0.44,-0.01], respectively.13 The finding of countercyclical risk at the firm 
level is common in the literature; a survey can be found in Bloom (2014). 
 
Figure 2.1: Idiosyncratic Dispersion and Business Cycles 
 
 
Note: This figure shows correlations between detrended log-real GDP and the detrended cross-
sectional standard deviation of ¤ r, and between detrended log-real GDP and median Gh¤ r¢ i, where ¤ r is the unexplained portion of sales growth from equation (1). All variables are detrended using the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with a parameter of 6.25. Firm data are from Compustat Fundamental. 
                                                 
13 We present our results based on the median ln (¤ r¢ ) and cross sectional standard deviation of ¤ r. 
The results are robust to different definitions of volatility. In particular, the correlation between the 
average ln (¤ r¢ ) and the log-real detrended GDP is -0.22 (significant at the 10 percent level), and the 
correlation between the sales-weighted standard deviation of ¤ r and the log-real detrended GDP is -





 In what follows, we explore the relationship between firm-level risk and the 
business cycle through the lens of our model. 
 
Section 3: Environment 
 
 Consider an economy with A markets (where A is large but finite), a 
representative consumer, and a continuum of competitive firms. Time is discrete, and 
a period is set to one year. Firms can service each of the different markets by 
incurring sales and marketing expenses. We adopt a broad definition of “market” that 
applies to the market-product space, the market-location space, or a combination of 
the two. 
3.1: Household Preferences and Endowments 
 
 
 The representative household derives utility from the consumption of the 
composite good s. More specifically, its preferences are given by ¦(s), where s is 
a composite of the consumption goods associated with each market G: 
 s = hB,,i§¨ 
§  , 1 > © > 0, (2) 
where , refers to consumption in market G, B, is a taste shock associated with 
market G in period , and 1 (1 − ©)⁄ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across 




log wB,§ F§ x ~Ah0, $@¢i 
where I is the degree of decreasing returns to scale in production.14  
 The household is endowed with one unit of labor that it supplies inelastically 
every period at wage 4 and receives dividends « through ownership of firms in the 
economy.15 
 The ideal Dixit-Stiglitz price index is then 
 K =  w¬,B, x
§§ ¨
 
§ §  . (3) 
 
The budget constraint faced by consumers is therefore 
 Ks ≤ 4 + «  . (4) 
3.2: Firms and Technology 
  
 Firms are described by their productivity parameter Q, which is constant over 
time. Production requires only one factor, labor. Given aggregate productivity E, a 
firm with productivity Q and serving to market G produces with technology given by 
 0,(Q) = EQ,F  , (5) 
where , is labor employed in the production of goods in period . We assume that 
firm-level productivity takes values on a finite set t, is drawn from a distribution with 
probability density function b(Q), and is constant over the lifespan of the firm. 
                                                 
14 This normalization of the exponent of B, only makes the analysis cleaner below. 
 




 Firms can reach and sell to consumers in market G by incurring sales, 
marketing, and other intangible expenses. We assume that these expenses are 
measured in units of labor and are convex in the number of markets that the firms 
serve.16 The total costs paid by a firm that serves  markets, measured in relation to 
labor costs, is 
 4Φ() = 4 2E ( − 1)®¯ . (6) 
Firms have incentives to participate in more markets to access more customers; this 
results in diversification of market-specific risk even though diversification is not the 
(risk neutral) firm’s objective. We are assuming that the firm runs an establishment 
(or has a physical presence) in each market it serves (a reasonable assumption for 
most industries with the possible exceptions of manufacturing, online trade, and 
certain sectors of the finance, insurance, and real estate industries). The assumption 
that marketing and sales expenses are convex in the number of markets that a firm 
serves reflects the notion that complexity in management is tied to some resource that 
is in fixed supply. This is consistent with the evidence that shows that a considerable 
set of firms operates in a small number of markets, but the distribution does not place 
all mass on only one point.17 A different assumption (such as a linear or strictly 
concave functional form) would result in all firms expanding to all markets. 
Moreover, while we do not have access to a direct measure of the total cost of 
                                                 
16 One interpretation of the demand differences corresponds to geographical distance or differences in 
products. Another interpretation is an increasing cost that arises from the complexity of serving many 
markets. 
17 In the quantitative section of the chapter, we use SIC codes, MSAs, and the number of 
establishments as different measures of market exposure. All three measures present a distribution of 




expansion to a new market, we observe selling, general, and administrative expenses 
(SGA) that are a proxy for market expansion costs since they refer to expenses on 
advertising, marketing, brand development, and research and development, among 
other items. Using this information and our measures of market presence, we estimate 
a cost function below that links changes in SGA with firm size and changes in market 
presence and find evidence consistent with a convex functional form. 
3.3: Timing 
 
The timing within the period is as follows: 
1. E is realized. 
2. Firms choose the number of markets in which to operate. 
3. Consumer taste shocks B, are realized. 
4. Taking prices as given, firms choose labor and produce. 
5. Households consume. 
This assumed timing simplifies the model solution because it abstracts from 
the specific market in which the firm chooses to participate and reduces the problem 
to choosing the number of markets the firm wants to reach. This choice is a function 
of aggregate productivity E and the firm’s idiosyncratic productivity Q. These 
assumptions imply that the solution to the dynamic problem of the firm boils down to 






Section 4: Equilibrium 
 
In this section, we present the definition and characterization of the 
competitive equilibrium of the model. 
4.1: Consumer’s Problem 
 
The household’s optimal conditions imply that its demand for consumption 
good G in period  is: 
 , = B,§ § w¬,K§ x
§  (4 + «) . (7) 
 
4.2: Firm’s Problem 
 
Firms are perfect competitors in each market in which they participate. It is 
most intuitive to start by solving the firm’s problem at the production stage and then 
deriving the optimal condition for the number of markets. After the shocks E and B, 
are revealed, the firm optimizes over the amount of labor to demand in each market 
they have previously chosen to serve. 
The profit function for a firm in market G is given by: 
 °,(Q) = max±²,³ ´¬,0,(Q) − 4,µ (8) 
subject to 
 0,(Q) = EQ,F  . (9) 




 ,(Q) = w 4¬,QEIx
F . (10) 
This implies that profits for a firm with productivity Q in market G are the following: 
 °,(Q) = h¬,QEi  F4 F F(I F F − I  F). (11) 
 At the beginning of the period (i.e., before firms observe B, but after they 
observe E), firms can derive the optimal number of markets in which to operate by 
taking the expected value of (11). More specifically, firms enter the * market as 
long as 
  ¶°M,(Q)· ≥ 4hΦ() − Φ( − 1)i . (12) 
In other words, (12) stipulates that the firm will expand into  markets as long as the 
expected profit in the last market is larger than the additional cost required to manage 
the last market. We denote by (Q) the number of markets in which a firm with 
productivity Q chooses to participate in period .18 
4.3: Definition of Equilibrium 
 
In any given period , the Competitive Equilibrium is a set of labor ,(Q) and 
market exposure (Q) decision rules, a wage rate 4, a vector of goods prices 
´¬,µ¨ , and a vector distribution of firms with productivity Q participating in each 
market G, ´¸,(Q)µ¨ , such that: 
1. Given the wage rate and prices, the labor decision rules and market exposure 
decision rules of all firms are the solution to problems (8) and (12). 
                                                 





2. The distribution of firms in market G equals 
 ¸,(Q) = b(Q)(Q)A . (13) 
3. The labor market clears, that is, 




ff . (14) 
4. Each price ¬, is such that it clears the G* market, that is, 
  ¸,(Q)0,(Q) = ,fff , (15) 
where , is given by equation (7). 
5. Aggregate dividends are 
 « = Π − 4  b(Q)Φh(Q)i,fff  (16) 
where Π denotes the sum of profits across markets and is given by 
 Π =   ¸,(Q)°,(Q)¨
f
ff . (17) 
With this definition established, we can characterize firms’ behavior and the 
aggregate equilibrium objects. 
 
4.4: Characterization of the Equilibrium 
 
 
 From the market clearing condition (15) and the optimal demand of goods (7), 
the equilibrium price in market G is 
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and 
 Q̃ = 1A  b(Q)(Q)Q  Ffff .  
Note that l is a function of aggregate productivity as well as the endogenous wage. 
Under the calibrated parameters that follow, l is countercyclical and is one of the 
driving forces of the countercyclicality of cross sectional price dispersion mentioned 
above. 
 Combining (12) (i.e., the equation that determines the number of markets for a 
firm of productivity Q) with the market clearing price in market G given by (18), we 
find that firms will expand into at least  markets only if 
 Q  FÃÄÅÆÅÇExpected marginal profit ≥ 4hΦ() − Φ( − 1)iÄÅÅÅÅÅÅÆÅÅÅÅÅÅÇMarginal cost  , (19) 
where 
Ã = !ËÌ¢ E  F4 FF  uI F F − I  Fv l  F . 
The expected marginal profit has two components: One is firm-specific and is a 
function of firm productivity Q, and the other is tied to the economy generally and 
depends on parameters at time  (such as the wage rate 4 and aggregate productivity E). Larger firm-specific productivity implies larger expected profits (given the 




parameters go in the following direction: higher levels of aggregate productivity 
generate higher expected profits, while higher wages reduce expected profits. Both 
aggregate effects are multiplied by the firm-specific productivity, generating an 
asymmetric response of productivity to the aggregate environmental parameters. 
 The labor market clearing condition (14) implies that 
4 + « = 4I 1 −  b(Q)Φh(Q)ifff  
⟹ Π4 = 1 −  b(Q)Φh(Q)i
f
ff  u1I − 1v . 
so, in equilibrium, the price index K becomes 
 K = 1 − ∑ b(Q)Φh(Q)ifff Q̃ 
 F 4IE wA!Ë
Ì¢ xF§ §  . (20) 
 Finding an equilibrium requires solving a system of three aggregate equations 
((14), (16), (17)) and three unknowns: 
 b(Q)Φh(Q)ifff  
4 Q̃ 
such that they are consistent with firm-level decisions. 
 Prior to describing our calibration, we now discuss an empirical implication of 




productivity (TFPR) can be derived in closed form.19 Conditional on the aggregate 
shock E, the model predicts a relationship between the firm’s idiosyncratic 
productivity Q and its volatility. The coefficient of variation of the weighted sum of 
TFPR to which the firm is exposed, conditional on serving  markets, is 
 sÏ(Q) = ÐÏ51 ¶∑ hQE¬,i  F⁄M · ¶∑ hQE¬,i  F⁄M ·  . (21) 
Note that (21) is presented as the coefficient of variation for a given firm with 
productivity Q. However, an identical expression can be derived if we focus on the 
coefficient of variation across establishments, conditional on firm-level idiosyncratic 
physical productivity. The analysis that follows is consistent with either 
interpretation.20 From (19), it is evident that the firm will participate in an increasing 
number of markets as a function of its productivity Q. Therefore, the coefficient of 
variation of the firm’s TFPR is a function of the firm’s productivity through its effect 
on the optimal number of markets that the firm will serve. Then, using the optimal 
market exposure decision, the coefficient of variation for a firm with productivity Q 
can be written as 
 sÏ(Q) = Ñ!ËÌ − 1(Q)  . (22) 
This result is based on the assumption that the shocks B, are i.i.d. However, as long 
as the shocks are not perfectly correlated (which would make them, in fact, one 
aggregate shock), the coefficient of variation falls as the firm is exposed to an 
                                                 
19 Following calibration we can develop more testable implications to connect the model to data with 
moments that are more empirically reliable but lack closed form expressions. 
20 As we discuss in the next section, consistent with the model, the data show that volatility is 




increasing number of shocks. This can be seen by analyzing the variance-covariance 
matrix of the shocks B,. Given that they have the same variance, the variance 
covariance matrix can be rewritten in terms of the correlation coefficient between two 
shocks multiplied by the common variance term. In this case, the coefficient of 
variation is given by the following expression: 
 sÏ(Q) = Ð¶!Ë
Ì − 1· ∑ ∑ ©ÒMÒM(Q)  , (23) 
where ©Ò is the correlation coefficient between the shocks  and y. In the case of 
i.i.d. shocks the double sum equals the number of shocks, and in the case of perfectly 
correlated shocks, it equals the square of the number of shocks. Anything in between 
means that the coefficient of variation falls as the number of varieties increases. 
 A key model prediction implied by (22) is that for firms that expand in booms 
and contract in recessions, the coefficient of variation at the firm level is 
countercyclical. Thus, the model asks us to split the data sample between those firms 
that adjust the number of markets to which they are exposed and those that do not (as 
opposed to, for example, splitting the sample by firm size). We perform this critical 
empirical test in Section 5.1 and show that the model is consistent with the empirical 
evidence. Moreover, we also observe that the variance of the weighted sum of TFPR 
to which the firm is exposed is countercyclical, given that the variance of prices 
follows the term l in (18) (which, at the calibrated parameters described below, is 
countercyclical). The fact that l is countercyclical implies a countercyclical 
dispersion in prices across markets, which is consistent with the evidence described 




market, the cross-sectional variance of TFPR at the plant level is also countercyclical, 
as reported by Kehrig (2011).  
 
 
Section 5: Calibration 
 
 This section presents the calibration of the model. Using this calibration, we 
then explore the workings of the model to study the business cycle properties of firm-
level risk. 
 We assume that firm-level productivity is distributed following a log-normal 
distribution with mean Q and standard deviation $f, so ln(Q) ~A(Q, $f¢). The number 
of markets, A, only determines the scale of the problem. We set its value to 100, but 
this number is irrelevant to our results. We assume that E ∈ {EÓ, EÔ} with transition 
probability Γ(E, E) and denote by Γ;r the (¥, 7)ℎ element of Γ(E, E). We normalize 
EÔ = 1. This leaves us with 10 parameters to calibrate: 
 ´©, $@ , I, Ö, 2, Q, $f, EÓ, Γ××, ΓÓÓµ (24) 
We calibrate the preference © to 0.83, a standard parameter in the trade literature.21 
We set I = 0.64, also a standard value in the literature and determines the labor share 
of output. To choose a value for $@, we obtain ¤̂ by estimating (1) on our KFS sample 
and evaluate the standard deviation of ln ¤̂ ÛÜÝÞÛ; this results in $@ = 3.04. This is a 
good approximation under the assumption that these very small firms are exposed to 
                                                 
21 In a model with monopolistic competition, this would imply a 20 percent markup. Recall, though, 




only one market, and it allows us to pin down the dispersion of market-specific risk.22 
To calibrate ΓÔÔ  and ΓÓÓ, we estimate the fraction of booms and recessions with data 
from the NBER. More specifically, for a given year, we set a recession indicator to 
one if two or more quarters in that year were dated as part of a recession by the 
NBER. Then, we identify years in which the indicator equals one with our periods of 
E = EÓ and construct a transition matrix. The estimate of Γ;r is the ratio of the 
number of times the economy switched from state ¥ to state 7 to the number of times 
the economy was observed to be in state ¥. We find that ΓÔÔ  is 0.86 and that ΓÓÓ is 
0.43. This implies that the unconditional probabilities of EÔ and EÓ are 0.80 and 0.20, 
respectively. Finally, we set EÓ=0.90. This amplitude of the support for E is consistent 
with data presented by Gordon (2005), where the average peak-to-trough distance in 
terms of the output gap is 7.9 percent for the period 1945-2005.23 
 The four remaining parameters are {Q, $f, Ö, 2}: the mean and standard 
deviation of the idiosyncratic productivity distribution as well as the two parameters 
that control the cost of firm expansion. These we jointly calibrate so that the model 
produces a firm size distribution matching the firm size distribution in the 2008 
                                                 
22 The KFS sample does not contain information on market exposure. The KFS focuses strictly on new 
businesses that most likely operate in only one market. Note also that from our Compustat-LBD link, 
we observe firms with only one establishment (i.e., exposed to only one market). They represent 
approximately 1 percent of total sales and total workers in 2011. However, since Compustat covers 
only publicly traded firms, we believe that these are not representative of firms exposed to a single 
market. Moreover, due to data limitations, the group of firms that only have one establishment likely 
includes firms in Compustat that are not perfectly matched with establishments in the LBD sample, 
introducing an additional source of measurement error into the calibration. 
23 This is computed by averaging the peaks and the troughs during the sample time period and taking 
their difference. Note that this time period excludes the 2007-2009 recession and the Great Depression, 




Census Bureau Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS).24,25 The identification of these 
parameters derives from the fat tail in the firm size distribution.26 
 
Table 2.1: Model Parameters 
Parameter  Value Target 
Preference parameter © 0.83 Elasticity of substitution 
Dispersion taste 
shock 
$@ 3.04 t«hlnh¤̂§  F§⁄ ii from KFS 
Labor share I 0.64 Standard value 
Aggregate prod. EÔ 1 Normalization 
Aggregate prod. EÓ 0.90 Peak to trough amplitude 
Transition prob. ΓÔÔ  0.86 NBER boom/recession 
Transition prob. ΓÓÓ 0.43 NBER boom/recession 
Cost function Ö 0.56 Firm size dist. (see Table 2.2) 
Cost function 2 0.46 Firm size dist. (see Table 2.2) 
Mean productivity Q̅ ln (1.7) Firm size dist. (see Table 2.2) 
Std. dev. productivity $f 0.4 Firm size dist. (see Table 2.2) 
 
 The accuracy of the firm size distribution match is shown in Table 2.2.27 We 
observe that the model adequately replicates the firm size distribution with a close 
match for all size classes. 
 
 
                                                 
24 The BDS covers all employer firms (about 5 million) that, in total, employ approximately 120 
million workers. For 2008, we observe 5,185 firms in our Compustat Fundamental sample, which is 
less than 0.1 percent of the total number of firms. 
25 In particular, we choose the parameters by minimizing the sum a sum of squares of the distance 
between model and data moments, where each moment is the fraction of firms in a given size bin (as 
specified by the BDS). Effectively, since we have four parameters and six moments, this is an 
overidentified model. 
26 To compute the average distribution in the model, we draw 100,000 firms from the idiosyncratic 
productivity distribution and simulate the model 20 times for 50 periods in each simulation in which 
aggregate shocks are drawn from Γ(E, E). 
27 Given that in the model the total measure of firms is equal to one, the model distribution reported 





Table 2.2: Firm Size Distribution (Employment) 
Employment size Data Model 
Firms with 1-4 employees 0.610 0.601 
Firms with 5-9 employees 0.176 0.209 
Firms with 10-19 employees 0.107 0.100 
Firms with 20-99 employees 0.089 0.064 
Firms with 100-499 employees 0.015 0.021 
Firms with 500 or more employees 0.003 0.005 
 
 The model also performs well when compared with other moments related to 
the core story of the chapter—in particular, to moments related to the joint 
distribution of markets and employment. In the data, 90 percent of firms have fewer 
than 20 employees and are almost all single-units (i.e., firms with only one 
establishment; in fact, the average number of establishments per firm conditional on 
firms employing fewer than 20 employees is 1.01 establishments). In the BDS the 
average number of establishments per firm is equal to 1.267. In the model, 91 percent 
of firms are single-units, and firms have an average of 1.186 establishments. These 
numbers reassure us that the functional forms and calibrated parameters in the model 
are generating reasonable quantities the dimensions relevant for the main results. 
Other dimensions worth examining are related to business cycle dynamics. The 
relevant items are real wages and dispersion of productivity and prices. Real wages in 
the model are procyclical and, at the calibrated parameters, the term l in (18) is 
countercyclical, resulting in countercyclical cross-sectional price variance and firm-




construction procyclical. Finally, the price level is countercyclical. These items are 
consistent with the business cycle data for the post-war US.28 
5.1: Workings of the Model 
 
 In this section, we further explore the workings of the model and present 
intuition for the main result along with a set of testable implications that we will 
compare with data in the following section. 
 We first describe how movement in E affects market exposure and the cross-
sectional distribution of firms in the model. Changes in E have a nonmonotone effect 
on firm-level decisions. The most productive firms expand in response to an increase 
in the aggregate shock, while less productive firms change their market exposure only 
slightly. This cyclical expansion and contraction is consistent with the procyclical net 
entry rate found for the manufacturing sector by Lee and Mukoyama (2012). 
Moreover, the uneven response of the change in the number of markets by firm size is 
also consistent with the data (see Figure 2.3 and Table 2.4 that follow). 
 Consistent with the characteristics of equilibrium, changes in E generate an 
endogenous change in firm-level risk. The impact of changes in E (from boom to 
bust) on the coefficient of variation from (22), by firm productivity level Q, is 
depicted in Figure 2.2. 
 It is clear that the impact of TFP shocks on the coefficient of variation is not 
monotone by productivity level. When the economy moves from boom to recession, 
the average firm-level volatility rises by 0.023 percent, and the average firm-level risk 
                                                 




for the top 10 percent and 1 percent of firms rises by 1.4 percent and 3.9 percent, 
respectively. This uneven change in volatility is a direct consequence of firms’ 
asymmetric response to variations in E. The fixed cost of expanding to an additional 
market creates regions of inaction. The business cycle has no effect on the volatility 
of firms with productivity Q less than about 3.3 since these firms never find it 
profitable to adjust their market exposure (indeed, those firms are operating only one 
market). Above that productivity level, regions of inaction still exist due to the cost of 
market reach adjustment.  
Observe that the regions of inaction shrink as productivity increases, 
disappearing entirely around Q = 6.5 (after which nonlinearities still exist as some 
firms adjust by more than one market at a time). Moreover, the impact of recessions 
on the coefficient of variation decreases with productivity at the thresholds at which 
firms adjust the number of markets in which they operate, since conditional on E, 
high-productivity firms are better diversified than those with low productivity. 
Changing from operating two markets to operating just one market, as firms with 
productivity around Q = 3.3 do, effects a large reduction in firm-level market 
diversification and, therefore, results in much higher firm-level volatility. However, 
adjusting from ten to nine markets does not reduce diversification as much. 
The above discussion implies that (a) the idiosyncratic volatility of firms 
engaged in market expansion and contraction should be countercyclical, and (b) the 
idiosyncratic volatility of firms not adjusting should be acyclical. As we show in 






Figure 2.2: Change in Firm Volatility over the Business Cycle 
 
Note: Percentage change in the coefficient of variation of firm-level risk when the economy moves 
from EÔ to EÓ (see equation (22)). 
 
 In this model with firm heterogeneity, the endogenous variation in the number 
of markets also has an effect on measured aggregate TFP. In this model, aggregate 
measured TFP is computed as aggregate production divided by aggregate labor (the 
only input of production) raised to the power I. Since the household supplies a unit 
measure of labor, measured aggregate TFP in period  equals total output 
∑ ∑ 0,(Q)¸,(Q)f̈ . As E increases and more productive firms expand 
proportionally to a larger set of markets, there is an additional positive effect on 
measured TFP beyond that due to the change in E. This endogenous amplification 
effect on measured TFP is nonnegligible and amounts to a further 13 percent increase 





 In summary, the predictions of the model include: 
1. Firm-level risk is countercyclical. 
2. Market exposure is procyclical. 
3. Firms that adjust their market exposure are larger than those not adjusting. 
4. Small and less productive firms display larger firm-level risk than large firms. 
5. Firm-level risk is countercyclical only for those adjusting the number of 
markets and not for those exposed to the same number of markets over the 
cycle. 
6. Large firms’ risk is more countercyclical than small firms’ risk. 
7. The elasticity of firm-level risk with respect to market exposure is negative. 
We confront these model predictions with the data in the following section. 
 
 
Section 6: Main Results and Testable Implications 
 
 In this section, we present the main results of our research—cyclical 
properties of firm-level risk and market participation measures—together with a 
description of how the model’s testable implications compare with the data. 
 Our analysis combines several data sources to cover many angles.29 As 
discussed in Section 2, we derive our measures of firm-level risk from the Compustat 
Fundamental and KFS data sets after estimating (1). Since the core Compustat sample 
covers five decades, this allows us to analyze how firm-level risk moves over the 
business cycle. Furthermore, we match our Compustat Fundamental panel with two 
                                                 
29 Appendix A2 includes a detailed description of how our sample is constructed and how the match 




other data sets. First, we link Compustat Fundamental with the Compustat Segment 
data. The Segment data provide information on sales for each firm by four-digit SIC 
code, at an annual frequency for most years in our sample.30 Like Bloom, 
Schankerman, and Van Reenen (2013), we use line of business (i.e., SIC codes) 
information as one of our direct measures of product and market exposure.31 Second, 
we match Compustat Fundamental with the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal 
Business Database. This allows us to obtain information on the number of 
establishments as well Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) locations for the firms in 
our Compustat sample. The number of establishments and number of MSAs in which 
a firm is operating provide two additional measures of market exposure.32 Finally, we 
also use the Census Bureau’s Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS) data which enable 
us to derive annual data starting in 1977 on the average number of establishments by 
firm size (employment) and to analyze its cyclical properties. 
6.1: Firm-Level Risk and Business Cycles 
 
 We start by presenting our main result, the negative correlation between firm-
level risk and the business cycle. Using the pseudo panel of firms from the model, we 
estimate firm-level volatility as we did in the data. That is, we compute the sales 
                                                 
30 The Segment sample starts in 1977 and provides 183,991 firm-year observations. 
31 On average, each firm reports 2.68 industry codes every year (approximately five industry codes per 
year when weighted by sales). 
32 These  measures of market reach (SIC codes, establishments, and MSA) do have weaknesses. For 
example, business lines, even at the four-digit level, can be associated with R&D; the construction of a 
plant has an investment component that we do not consider in the model, and firms in some industries 
might ship their goods to various locations from only one establishment (this is more problematic in 
manufacturing than in services or retail). However, the fact that most of our results are robust across 




growth (in logs) from period  to period  + 1 and regress it against a firm fixed 
effect, size (number of employees), and a time dummy capturing aggregate conditions 
(booms or recessions). That is, we estimate 
 ∆ ln(Q5Q ) = <Q  + <E + <¢ ln(Q¡E ) + ¤  (25) 
and obtain the residuals ¤  from (25) to derive our measure of firm-level risk ln (¤ ¢ ), 
as in Castro, Clementi, and MacDonald (2009). We study the cyclical properties of 
this measure of firm-level risk. The findings are summarized in Table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3: Model Firm-Level Idiosyncratic Risk over the 
Business Cycle 
 Correlation with det. GDP 
  Model 
 Data All Firms Top 5% 
Median ln(¤ ¢ ) -0.46*** -0.42*** -0.20* 
Cross-sectional td(¤ ) -0.23* -0.18*** -0.35*** 
Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at 
the 10% level 
 
 We find that both for the entire sample and for the top 5 percent of firms 
(which are the model firms most comparable to the Compustat sample), measures of 
firm-level risk generating by the model are significantly countercyclical. More 
specifically, for the top 5 percent of model firms, the correlation between median 
ln (¤ ¢ ) and GDP equals -0.20 (significant at the 10 percent level), and the correlation 
between the cross-sectional standard deviation of ¤  and GDP is -0.35 (significant at 
the 1 percent level). These model correlations are -0.42 (significant at the 1 percent 
level) and -0.18 (significant at the 7 percent level) if computed using all firms from 
the model instead of just the top 5 percent. Meanwhile, in our panel of U.S. firms 




GDP is -0.46 with a 90 percent interval of [-0.625,-0.257], and the correlation 
between the cross-sectional standard deviation of risk and GDP is -0.23 with a 90 
percent interval of [-0.439,-0.017], as shown in Section 2.33 
6.2: Market Exposure and Business Cycles 
 
 
 The model predicts that high-productivity firms respond to changes in 
aggregate productivity by expanding and contracting the number of markets in which 
they operate (with corresponding changes in selling expenses). However, these 
observed changes in market participation do not translate into a monotone 
relationship in terms of the cyclicality of volatility, as shown in Figure 2.2. The 
reason is that high-productivity firms are already exposed to a large number of 
markets even in bad times. Therefore, their reaction to aggregate productivity changes 
does not affect their volatility dramatically, while firms that operate in relatively few 
markets during recessions and expand in booms experience large fluctuations in their 
volatility over the cycle. 
 We first test whether market exposure is procyclical for those firms engaged 
in market expansions and contractions. Figure 2.3 reports how the average number of 
markets that firms participate in (as measured by four-digit SIC codes, establishment 
counts, MSA counts, and the product of SIC codes and establishment counts) moves 
for firms that change their market exposure in a given year (“changers”). 
 As predicted by the model, the average change in market exposure among 
changers behaves procyclically for all of our definitions of market participation. The 
                                                 
33 This measure of firm-level risk derived from sales growth has been widely used in the literature. 





correlation coefficients between detrended GDP and average change in market 
exposure for changers is 0.28 for SIC codes, 0.48 for establishments, 0.51 for MSAs, 
and 0.31 for SICs×establishments. 
 While not as direct as the measures of market exposure presented thus far, 
guided by our model we also observe how expenses associated with market reach 
move with the business cycle. In the model, the cost of market exposure is given by 
4Φ() and is predicted to be procyclical given that it is a function of . In our 
Compustat sample, we use Selling, General, and Administrative (SGA) expenditures 
as the measure associated with operating the firm as a function of the firm’s 
complexity. We also look at the advertising component of SGA, as it should closely  
follow the market reach of the firm. Figure 2.4 shows the correlation between these 
indirect measures of market exposure and detrended GDP.  
Figure 2.4 shows that log real GDP and our measures of market reach 
expenses are positively correlated, as predicted. The correlation is 0.283 (significant 
at the 5 percent level) and 0.149 (significant at the 10 percent level) when expenses 
are measured as SGA expenses and advertising expenses, respectively. In the model, 
business cycle fluctuations in selling expenses result in fluctuations in the size of the 
labor force employed in related activities. The labor force share engaged in these 
activities reaches 17.8 percent during booms and falls to 2.65 percent during 
recessions (in the model); however, the model overpredicts the correlation between 
GDP and median selling expenses since this correlation (in the model) is 1 for the top 
5 percent of firms.34 
                                                 
34 Sampling from the top of the model’s distribution is appropriate since Compustat corresponds to the 




Figure 2.3: Average Change in Market Exposure for “Changers” 
 
Note: Detrended GDP corresponds to HP detrended log-real GDP (parameter 6.25). The market 
exposure measure corresponds to the number of four-digit SIC codes (i.e., line of business), number of 
establishments a firm operates, number of MSAs in which a firm has establishments, and the product 
of establishments and SIC codes. “Changers” are firms that change market exposure measure in a 
given year. We report the average change in market exposure conditional on being a “changer”. 








Figure 2.4: Market Reach Expenses and Business Cycles 
 
 
Note: Log-real expenses (SGA and Advertising) correspond to the median of the observed distribution 
in any given year. Series are detrended using an HP filter with parameter 6.25. GDP data are available 
since 1947. In Panel (i), log-real expenses are measured by Selling, General, and Administrative 




6.3: Market Exposure and Firm Size 
 
 
Another implication of the model is that firms that react to the cycle by 
changing the number of markets in which they participate are larger, on average, than 
those that do not change their market exposure. Table 2.4 shows descriptive statistics 
for both the linked Compustat Fundamental/Compustat Segment data and the linked 
Compustat/LBD data; “changers” are firms that change their market reach, and “non-




Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics, “Changers” versus “Non-changers” 
 Full sample “Changers” “Non-changers” 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev. 
       
Number of SIC codes 
Sales 1607 8679 2739 12460 1388 7716 
Emp. 8.4 33.9 11.7 41.5 7.8 32.2 
SGA 269 1416 465 1979 230 1273 
Adv. 50 273 80 367 43 247 
SICs 2.6 1.9 3.3 2.4 2.5 1.7 
       
Number of establishments 
Sales 1553 8308 2316 9547 271 1828 
Emp. 8.3 33.4 12.3 41.2 1.4 8.2 
SGA 260 1370 399 1634 56 332 
Adv. 49 265 77 308 9 71 
Estabs. 116 565 215 765 8 77 
       
Number of MSAs 
Sales 1553 8308 2583 10322 418 2574 
Emp. 8.3 33.4 13.7 44.1 2.3 12.4 
SGA 260 1370 439 1725 86 565 
Adv. 49 264 86 326 15 112 
MSAs 32 93 66 127 8 41 
       
Number of SICs×establishments 
Sales 1553 8308 2108 8945 253 1840 
Emp. 8.3 33.4 11.4 39.1 1.4 7.9 
SGA 260 1370 364 1544 53 331 
Adv. 49 264 71 290 9 73 
SIC×Estab 406 2552 705 3388 22 428 
       
Note: Sales; Selling, General, and Administrative expenses (SGA); and Advertising Expenses (Adv.) 
are expressed in millions of dollars deflated using BEA two-digit SIC price deflators for value added. 
Employment (Emp.) is expressed in thousands of employees. Source: Data are from the linked 
Compustat Fundamental to Compustat Segment and the linked Compustat Fundamental to LBD data. 
We formally test for statistically significant differences to find that all the moments for “changers” are 








we find that the fraction of firms that adjust their market participation is acyclical. 
This fraction is between 20 percent and 56 percent of the total number of firms, 
depending on the definition of market, and this fraction is uncorrelated with 
detrended GDP.35 
We find that, conditional on the number of SIC codes, changers are about 
twice as big as non-changers in terms of sales, SGA expenses, and advertising 
expenses. They are 50 percent larger in terms of employment and 33 percent larger in  
terms of the number of SIC codes they operate. But changers are between five and 
nine times larger than non-changers when we consider the number of establishments 
each firm operates or the number of MSAs in which each firm is present, based on 
sales, employees, or expenditures. Changers are 26 times larger than non-changers in 
terms of establishment count and 31 times larger in terms of the product of SIC codes 
and establishments. 
We next split the sample by firm size classes to determine whether the 
cyclicality of market exposure for large firms is consistent with that of changers. In 
this case, the measure of market exposure corresponds to the number of active 
establishments per firm. Using publicly available BDS data, it is possible to derive 
the average number of establishments by firm size (employment), annually from 1977 
to 2009, and analyze its cyclical properties.36 The last three columns of Table 2.5 
                                                 
35 Market participation is measured by the number of products (SIC codes) for which firms report 
sales, the number of establishments they operate, the number of MSAs in which they have 
establishments, or the product of establishments and SIC codes. The fraction of changing firms is 20 
percent, 52 percent, 42 percent, and 56 percent for these market definitions, respectively, and this 
fraction is uncorrelated with GDP. 
36 The BDS is compiled from the LBD. The LBD is a longitudinal database of business establishments 
and firms covering the years from 1977 on. The BDS provides annual statistics on the number of 




present evidence on the change in establishment count by firm size between periods 
when log-real GDP is above and below trend as well as the correlation between the 
number of establishments per firm and detrended GDP (conditional on firm size). 
Table 2.5 shows that for most size categories, there is a minimal change in the 
number of establishments per firm between periods when GDP is above trend and 
those when it is below trend (the correlation with detrended GDP gives similar 
results). However, for large firms (those with at least 5,000 workers), the number of 
plants is larger when GDP is above trend than when GDP is below trend, and the 
elasticity with respect to detrended GDP is close to 1. This difference is economically 
 
Table 2.5: Number of Plants per Firm over the Business Cycle 











Cyclical properties, # plants per firm 
Avg. # plants when GDP Elast. 
w/ GDP below trend above trend 
1-4 1909.7 6.6 2.3 1.00 1.00 -0.009 
5-9 736.4 7.3 6.6 1.03 1.03 -0.018 
10-19 407.7 8.4 12.7 1.1 1.09 0.048 
20-49 237.0 11.0 24.4 1.28 1.27 0.151 
50-99 71.0 7.5 40.2 1.77 1.73 0.023 
100-249 35.0 8.2 51.4 3.02 2.95 -0.436 
250-499 9.8 5.2 59.0 5.85 5.74 -0.194 
500-999 4.7 4.8 63.2 10.54 10.63 0.179 
1,000-2,499 3.0 6.5 66.1 21.56 21.28 -0.096 
2,500-4,999 1.1 4.8 60.5 46.69 46.77 0.378 
5,000 + 1.5 29.7 75.8 167.43 175.19 0.953* 
Note: We extract a linear trend component from all variables. The “Avg. # firms” corresponds to the 
average number of firms in each size bin over our sample (in thousands). “Fraction total emp.” is 
computed as the average of total employees in each size bin divided by total employment. “Avg. emp. 
per plant” corresponds to the average number of employees per establishment in each size category. 
“Avg. # of plants when GDP below trend or above trend” is derived from a linear regression of the 
average number of establishments by firm size on a constant, a linear trend, and a dummy that 
identifies periods in which GDP is above trend. GDP corresponds to log-real GDP. The trend for GDP 
is computed using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with a parameter of 6.25. “Elast. w/ GDP” 
corresponds to the elasticity between the average number of plants and detrended GDP. This elasticity 
is derived from a linear regression of log average number of establishments by firm size on a constant, 
a linear trend, and log-real detrended GDP. 
* denotes significance at the 10% level. 





and statistically significant.37 This is relevant in terms of activity and observed 
dispersion because, as Table 2.5 shows, these firms account for about 30 percent of 
total employment and comprise the top 1,450 largest firms in the economy (equal to 
just under half of the number of firms included in our Compustat sample).38 
Furthermore, since the change in the number of plants is approximately eight between 
periods when GDP is above and below trend in these 1,450 firms, and these firms 
employ about 75 workers per plant, the change in employment coming only from this 
margin amounts to 1.29 percent of total private nonfarm employment.39 
Within-firm expansions and contractions seem to be correlated with the 
business cycle. Broda and Weinstein (2010) report that the product portfolio of firms 
is procyclical based on bar code data. This observation is consistent with our evidence 
and our model. In recessions, firms contract their product mix; in booms, firms 
expand their product mix and expose themselves to more markets. 
We next exploit the relationship between market exposure and size to further 
test the model. In the model, low-productivity firms (which are small on average) are 
more volatile than high-productivity firms (which are large on average) since they are 
                                                 
37 This is consistent with the evidence presented in Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012) that the net job 
creation of large firms or establishments commoves negatively and more strongly with aggregate 
unemployment than the net job creation of small employers at business cycle frequencies. 
38 Note that the reported numbers in Table 2.5 correspond to detrended averages from the period 1977-
2009. The total number of firms for the year 2009 was around 3,000. 
39 Another margin of adjustment for firms is the number of workers per plant. As we show in Appendix 
A2.4, the variation in the average number of workers per establishment is positive and significant for 
small firms but not for large firms. Moreover, the change in the number of workers over the business 
cycle coming from the change in the number of plants per firm is larger than the change in the number 
of workers coming from adjustment in the number of workers per plant (which represents 1.15 percent 




exposed to a lower number of markets. To test this prediction, we examine whether a 
negative relationship between firm size and firm-level risk is present in the data. 
Figure 2.5 presents the estimated distribution of idiosyncratic risk for our two 
samples (i.e., the KFS and Compustat).  
 
Figure 2.5: Distribution of Firm Risk across Sample 
 
Note: Idiosyncratic dispersion is based on sales growth. Sources: Compustat Fundamental and KFS. 
 
Consistent with the model, we find that small firms (i.e., those in KFS) are 
considerably more volatile than large firms (i.e., those in Compustat).40 This is 
                                                 
40 Some firms in our Compustat sample have only one establishment (these represent 4 percent of 




consistent with the evidence presented in Haltiwanger et al. (2013). The median 
dispersion in the KFS is more than five times the median dispersion in Compustat. 
To further explore the link between firm-level risk and firm size, Table 2.6 
presents several moments of the distribution of firm-level risk conditional on size. To 
construct this table, we condition on a particular size class then compute moments of 
the distribution of firm-level risk. 
Table 2.6 shows that all moments of the distribution of firm-level risk are 
decreasing in firm size. That is, consistent with the predictions of the model, we find 
that large firms tend to be less volatile than small firms. For example, the median 
values of ln (¤¢) imply that a firm with 10 to 19 employees faces 37 percent less risk 
than a firm with one to four employees, and a firm with 20 to 99 employees faces 74 
percent less risk than a firm with one to four employees.41 
 
Table 2.6: Firm-Level Risk (Conditional on Size) 
 Moments distribution ln(¤¢) 
Size 
(employment) 




Top 10% Top 1% 
1-4 -1.97 -1.75 -10.00 -5.26 1.19 3.05 
5-9 -2.31 -1.96 -9.76 -5.86 0.85 2.67 
10-19 -2.47 -2.21 -10.37 -5.78 0.66 2.62 
20-99 -3.35 -3.09 -11.39 -6.75 -0.26 20.8 
100-499 -4.18 -3.87 -12.14 -7.41 -1.32 0.96 
500+ -5.26 -4.94 -13.03 -8.45 -2.46 -0.44 
Note: Idiosyncratic dispersion is based on sales growth. 
Source: Compustat Fundamental-Compustat Segment; Compustat Fundamental-LBD. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
Compustat consists of publicly traded firms, and single-unit firms are likely not representative of 
publicly traded firms. 




6.4: Conditional Firm-Level Risk over the Business Cycle 
 
 
 In this section we split the data in two different ways to study the cyclicality 
of firm-level risk. First, we look at the difference in cyclicality of firm-level risk 
between changers and non-changes (i.e., those firms that change their market 
exposure and those that do not). Second, we look at differences in the cyclicality of 
firm-level risk conditional on firm size. The model implies that changers’ and large 
firms’ risk should be countercyclical, while risk for non-changers and small firms 
should be acyclical. The evidence is consistent with the model. 
We first test whether, by reacting to the business cycle, firms that change their 
market exposure experience a countercyclical pattern of volatility, while firms that do 
not change their market exposure have acyclical volatility. This is an implication of 
the model result described by Figure 2.2. Figure 2.6 presents the evolution of our 
measure of firm-level risk over the business cycle conditional on being a changer or a 
non-changer, as well as the correlation of each series with detrended GDP. 
As Figure 2.6 illustrates, the data are consistent with the predictions of the 
model. Splitting the sample into changers and non-changers (using our four measures 
of market exposure) reveals that the correlation between firm-level risk and GDP for 
changers and non-changers is different. The changers’ median ¤¢ is countercyclical, 
with a GDP correlation between -0.31 and -0.42 (significant at the 5 percent level). 
Converseley, among non-changers the correlation between median ¤¢ and GDP is 
between -0.1 and -0.2 and is never statistically different from zero.42 
                                                 
42 These findings are robust to a different measure of firm-level risk derived from the time series 




Figure 2.6: Volatility of “Changers” versus “Non-changers” 
 
Note: Detrended GDP corresponds to HP detrended log-real GDP (parameter 6.25). The market 
exposure measure corresponds to the number of four-digit SIC codes (i.e., line of business), the 
number of establishments the firm operates, the number of MSAs in which the firms are present, and 
the product of establishments and SIC codes. “Changers refers to firms that change market exposure in 
a given period; “non-changers” refers to firms that do not. Data are from linked Compustat-
Fundamental and linked Compustat-LBD. 
 
The model predicts a non-monotone but broadly decreasing relationship 
between firm-level risk and firm size (see Figure 2.2 and associated discussion). 




number of markets while small firms do not, so firm-level risk conditional on firm 
size should display different cyclical properties across size categories. 
Figure 2.7 presents the correlation between firm-level risk and GDP, 
conditional on firm size. To construct this figure we rank firms by their size 
(employment) and label as “small” those firms in the bottom 25 percent of the size 
distribution, as “medium” those firms in the interquartile range of the distribution, 
and as “large” those firms in the top 25 percent of the distribution.43 
 
Figure 2.7: Firm Risk over the Business Cycle (Conditional on Size) 
 
 
Note: Idiosyncratic risk based on sales growth. Sources: Linked Compustat Fundamental-LBD. 
                                                 
43 Results are robust to size bins based on the bottom decile, the 10-90th percentile range, and the top 




The evidence is consistent with our model and shows that the correlation is 
negative and stronger for large firms than for small firms.44 This is not surprising 
based on the model since, as we discussed in the previous section, not only do 
changers tend to be large but large firms tend to be changers. The correlation of the 
median ¤¢ and GDP is -0.04 and -0.33 for small and large firms, respectively (within 
the top 5 percent of firms, which is our model analog of Compustat). 
6.5: Determinants of Firm-Level Risk 
 
 
 To understand the properties of firm-level volatility and market exposure, we 
derive a testable implication that links market exposure (Q), selling expenses, and 
firm-level volatility ln(¤ ¢ ) derived from (25). The model predicts that market 
exposure and selling expenses are key to understanding the evolution of firm-level 
risk. As we describe in detail in the following section, we observe in the data several 
relatively direct measures of market exposure as well as selling expenses, which in 
our model correspond with ⋆(Q) and 4Φh⋆(Q)i, respectively. Therefore, we 
estimate the regression 
 ln(¤ ¢ ) = OQ  + Oln ( ) +  ¢ (26) 
where ln(¤ ¢ ) is our measure of firm-level risk, OQ  is a firm fixed effect, and   
represents either the number of markets or selling expenses.  
Table 2.7 summarizes our model’s predictions. The simulated elasticities of 
firm-level risk with respect to the number of markets and selling expenses are -0.58 
                                                 
44 This result is robust to a measure of firm-level risk derived from an AR(1) model of ln(Q5Q). In 





(significant at 5 percent) and -0.05 (significant at 5 percent), respectively, when 
looking at a sample including all model firms. Restricting attention to the top 5 
percent of firms (our model counterpart to Compustat) results in firm-level risk 
elasticities of -0.21 and -0.15 with respect to markets and expenses, respectively. 
These values are very close to the ones reported in Table 2.8, which are obtained in 
actual data. We turn to those results next. 
 
Table 2.7: Model Firm-Level Idiosyncratic Volatility and Market 
Exposure 
 Dependent variable lnh¤ r¢ i 
 All sample Top 5 percent 
lnh ri -0.579*** - -0.210*** - 
 (0.0034) - (0.0246) - 
lnh¬GQQ ri - -0.054*** - -0.145*** 
 - (0.0003) - (0.0065) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. ln(¤ ¢ ) is constructed from the estimated residual of equation (25). 
 
  
 Given our estimate of idiosyncratic risk ¤ r from (1) (as in Castro, Clementi, 
and MacDonald (2009)), we proxy firm-level by lnh¤ r¢ i and study how it is related 
to our various market exposure measures once industry-specific factors are accounted 
for.45 We estimate the following log-linear equation (as we did in the model-produced 
data): 
 lnh¤ r¢ i = O  + Jr + I lnhá ri + I¢ +  r (27) 
                                                 
45 This specification of the variance allows us to identify a value for the variance of every firm in 
industry ¥ and year , and it is consistent with the multiplicative heteroskedasticity model analyzed by 
Harvey (1976). More specifically, this formulation results from assuming that $ r¢ , the variance of the 




where O  is a firm fixed effect, Jr  is an industry- and year-specific component, 
ln(á r) is a measure of market exposure for firm ¡ in sector ¥ at time , and  is a 
time trend.46 As mentioned above, we use several different market exposure measures 
as á r. From our Compustat-LBD linked sample we obtain establishment counts and 
MSA counts by firm. Using our Compustat Segment linked sample we obtain the 
number of SIC codes in which firms have sales. We also study the interaction 
between establishments and product markets. Finally, we consider indirect measures 
of market exposure, SGA expenses and advertising expenses from the Compustat 
Fundamental sample (and SGA expenses for small firms in the KFS sample).47 Table 
2.8 reports the results of these regressions. 
 
Table 2.8: Firm-Level Regressions with Dependent Variable ln(ε2) 
 Estabs. MSAs SICs Est×SIC Adv SGA SGA 
ln(á) -0.081 -0.094 -0.137 -0.075 -0.134 -0.301 -0.085 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.021) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.036) 
        
N 129700 129700 155200 124400 67000 177200 2500 
R2 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.042 0.044 0.16 
        
Source LBD LBD Comp. Comp.-
LBD 
Comp. Comp. KFS 
Note: All results are significant at the 1% level except for those from KFS, which are significant at the 
5% level. All regressions include firm fixed effects, industry-year controls, and time trends. Sources: 
Number of establishments and MSAs taken from the LBD; number of SICs and expenditures taken 
from Compustat, except those noted as coming from KFS. lnh¤ r¢ i is derived from estimating equation 
(1) on our Compustat Fundamental sample. Regressions are run after performing relevant links 
between Compustat Fundamental and Compustat Segments and the LBD. 
 
                                                 
46 We show below that, consistent with the evidence presented in Decker et al. (2015), a time trend is 
necessary because the variance of idiosyncratic risk among public firms has had a trend rise and fall in 
recent decades. 




 Regressions using various measures of market exposure produce reasonably 
similar results, in terms of both sign and magnitude. The elasticity of firm-level 
volatility with respect to these measures ranges from 7.5 to 13.7 percent. Even using 
advertising expenses as the measure of market reach delivers an estimate that is very 
close to those obtained using direct measures of market reach. All of the measures 
reported in the first five regressions use Compustat data (linked to the Segment files 
or the LBD), so the model counterpart for these firms is the top end of the firm size 
distribution. In the model, when we use the top 5 percent of firms by productivity, the 
elasticity of risk with respect to market exposure is -0.21, which is close to the 
numbers obtained from our empirical model reported above.48 
 Finally, when looking at the indirect measures of market exposure—namely 
SGA expenses—we find that the elasticity is -0.30 for the Compustat sample and -
0.09 for the KFS sample. The model performs well along this dimension, producing 
an elasticity of -0.14 among the top 5 percent of firms and -0.05 among all firms.49 
 
6.6: Evidence on Market Exposure Expenses 
 
 
In this section, we briefly digress to provide evidence about the relationship 
between market exposure and expenses. The model assumes that marketing and sales 
expenses are increasing in the number of markets that a firm serves. The evidence is 
                                                 
48 The estimated negative elasticity is robust to various definitions of firm-level volatility, including a 
definition based on time series standard deviations. 
49 The estimated firm-level volatility $â r¢ = exphOâ  + Jr + Iâ Ghá ri + Iâ¢i hâ ri is, like our 




broadly consistent with this assumption and reflects the notion that complexity in 
management is tied to some resource that is in fixed supply. 
 More specifically, we have access to selling, general, and administrative 
expenses (SGA), which are a proxy for market expansion and costs since they refer to 
expenses on, for example, advertising, marketing, brand development, and research 
and development. Using this information and our measures of market exposure (SICs, 
establishments, and MSAs), we estimate a cost function that links changes in SGA 
with firm size and changes in market presence. For each measure of market presence, 
we classify firms according to how broad their market presence is: “small”, 
“medium”, and “large”. We then estimate how the change in expenses is correlated 
with the change in market exposure plus the change in market exposure interacted 
with a dummy for the size category after conditioning on firm size (employment). We 
omit the medium size category, so a full convex functional form would result in a 
negative coefficient for the interaction term between changes in market exposure and 
the small category, and positive coefficient on the interaction term between changes 
in market exposure and the large category. Table 2.9 reports the results.  
The results support the assumption of a convex functional form, either across 
all size categories or at least between two of them, for the three measures of market 
exposure. In particular, when using SICs as the measure of market exposure, the 
coefficient on ∆Markets × Small is negative, and the coefficient on 
∆Markets × Large is positive. When using establishments or MSAs as a measure of 




categories (in the small-medium portion for establishments, and in the medium-large 
portion for MSAs). 
 The regressions provide evidence for a convex functional form, either across 
all size categories or at least between two of them, for the three measures of market 
exposure. 
 
Table 2.9: Cost of Expansion and Market Exposure 
 Market definition 
 SIC Estab. MSA 
Size 0.0017 0.0023 0.0023 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
D.Markets 9.476 0.298 0.004 
 (1.16) (0.01) (0.06) 
D.Markets*Small -1.124 -0.312 2.109 
 (0.24) (0.01) (0.08) 
D.Markets*Large 8.728 -0.266 0.368 
 (2.40) (0.01) (0.06) 
    
R2 0.05 0.09 0.09 
N 135300 111300 111300 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the firm-level change in 
Selling, General, and Administrative expenses. Independent variables 
are  size (employment) and the firm-level change in market exposure 
(with interactions). Data are from the linked Compustat Fundamental-





Section 7: Conclusion 
 
 
 Consistent with previous literature, using a panel of U.S. firms we document 
the countercyclical nature of idiosyncratic firm-level risk. We propose a theory of 
endogenous volatility over the business cycle based on firm-level market exposure to 




markets. The result is that high-productivity firms operate in more markets, making 
them less volatile than their low-productivity counterparts through an intuitive 
diversification mechanism. Notably, low-productivity firms do not adjust market 
exposure in reaction to the cycle, whereas medium-sized and large firms do, 
explaining the cyclical properties of firm-level volatility. 
 From the model, we derive a set of testable implications for measures of 
market exposure and firm-level volatility and show that the empirical evidence is 
broadly consistent with the theory. Specifically, using firm-level data from Compustat 
Fundamental and Compustat Segment data, as well as the LBD, we show that 
measures of market exposure are procyclical and that the volatility of firms that 
expand and contract is countercyclical, while volatility is acyclical for those not 
engaged in market exposure adjustments. This holds when market exposure is 
measured directly in terms of lines of business, establishment counts, and geographic 
locations, and it holds for indirect measures such as selling, general, and 
administrative expenses or advertising. Moreover, using data from Compustat, the 
LBD, and the KFS, we show that firm-level idiosyncratic risk is negatively correlated 
with all measures of market exposure, even when controlling for firm, year, and 











 Financial Intermediary Profits 
 
 
 The financial intermediary’s profit maximization problem is given by: 
max",, 1;(?% + ?D) − 1måppåæ6 lm + 1*0op − <;(?% + ?D) − a(?% + ?D − lm) − alf 
subject to 
?% + ?D − lm + 0op = lf . 
The first-order conditions follow: 
?% , ?D ∶  1; = 1 + <; + a  lm ∶  16 = 1 + a (for borrowers)  op ∶  1* = 1 .  
Substituting the first-order conditions into the profit function yields 
K1Lç¡Q = 1(?% + ?D) − alm + 10op − 1lf  . 
Substituting the financial market clearing condition given by (20) in Chapter 1 yields 
the result of zero profits. 
 
 Aggregate Quantities 
 
 
 The aggregated variables used in market clearing conditions and the aggregate 




lf =  c c c b(Q, 5, ℎ, E)5(Q, 5, ℎ, E)6~(Q, 5, ℎ, E)dEdℎd5f*6

f  (A1.1) 
lm =  c c c b(Q, 5, ℎ, E)5(Q, 5, ℎ, E)h1 − 6~(Q, 5, ℎ, E)idEdℎd5f*6

f  (A1.2) 
n =  c c c b(Q, 5, ℎ, E)ℎ(Q, 5, ℎ, E)dEdℎd5f*6

f  (A1.3) 
op =  c c c b(Q, 5, ℎ, E)(Q, 5, ℎ, E)pD(Q, 5, ℎ, E)dEdℎd5f*6

f  (A1.4) 
s =  c c c b(Q, 5, ℎ, E)(Q, 5, ℎ, E)dEdℎd5f*6

f  (A1.5) 
Af =  c c c b(Q, 5, ℎ, E)(1 − (Q, 5, ℎ, E)dEdℎd5f*6

f  (A1.6) 
AD =  c c c b(Q, 5, ℎ, E)G(Q, 5, ℎ, E)dEdℎd5f*6

f  (A1.7) 
?D =  c c c b(Q, 5, ℎ, E)7(Q, 5, ℎ, E)dEdℎd5f*6

f  (A1.8) 
=D =  c c c b(Q, 5, ℎ, E)E7(Q, 5, ℎ, E)FG(Q, 5, ℎ, E)HdEdℎd5f*6

f  (A1.9) 
tD = c c c b(1, 5, ℎ, E)(1, 5, ℎ, E)dEdℎd5f*6  (A1.10) 
n6qr =  c c c b(Q, 5, ℎ, E)**(Q, 5, ℎ, E)dEdℎd5f*6

f  (A1.11) 
where 6~(Q, 5, ℎ, E) is 1 for households with positive financial assets and 0 for 




Aggregate Resource Constraint 
The workers’ budget constraint is given by equation (9) in Chapter 1, and the 
entrepreneurs’ budget constraint is given by (12) in Chapter 1. These can be collapsed 
into a general budget constraint applying to all households:1 
  + 5 + 0(ℎ − ℎ) + pD1*0 + **20ℎ
≤ E7FGH − 1;7 − 4G − QP + (1 − )4 + (1 + 16)5 . (A1.12) 
Recall that 7 = G =  = 0 for workers, and  = 1 for entrepreneurs. Since utility is 
increasing in consumption, the budget constraint holds with equality for all 
households. Integrating both sides of (A1.12) across the entire state space yields the 
aggregate resource constraint: 
  c c c ( + 5 + 0(ℎ − ℎ) + pD1*0 + **20ℎdEdℎd5e*6f
=  c c c hE7FGH − 1;7 − 4G − QPe*6f
+ (1 − )4 + (1 + 16)5idEdℎd5 . 
(A1.13) 
Rearranging and using the notation for aggregate quantities given by (A1.1-A1.A11) 
and substituting the financial sector’s first-order conditions given by (17)-(19) in 
Chapter 1 simplifies the equation: 
 s + lm + lf + 0(n − n) + 10op + 20n6qr
= =D − (1 + <; + a)?D + 4(Af − AD) − tDP+ (1 + 1)lf + (1 + 1 + a)lm . 
(A1.14) 
                                                 
1 Optimal choice variables are functions of the state (i.e., 5 = 5(Q, 5, ℎ, E)); for notational simplicity, 




Transforming (A1.13) using the market clearing conditions described by (20) and 
(21) in Chapter 1 yields: 
 s + ?% + ?D + 0op + 0(n − n) + 20n6qr
= =D − (1 + <; + a)?D + 4A% − tDP + ?% + ?D + 0op+ alm + 1(?D + ?%) . 
 
The CRS technology of corporate production implies that =% = (1 + a + <;)?% +4A%; substituting this identity and the housing market clearing condition given by 
(22) in Chapter 1 into the aggregated budget constraint yields: 
 s + ?% + ?D + 20n6qr + a(?D + ?%)
= =D + =% + ?% + ?D + 0op − (<; + a)(?D + ?%) − tDP+ alm . 
 
 
Rearranging yields the aggregate resource constraint given by (23) in Chapter 1. 
 
A1.2: Computational Approach 
 
 
Tauchen Method Implementation 
 
 
Consider a K51L(M, N) process E. Discretize the E space into Ae equally 
spaced points, with E = M and 
E¨è = M0.001é . 
This is the value of E for which the cumulative density function is equal to 0.999 (this 
value is necessarily arbitrary, since the domain of the random variable is unbounded). 




°  = ê ME  − E  − E  2 ë
é − ê ME  + E ® − E 2 ë
é  , ¡ ∈ {2, … , Ae − 1} 
° = 1 − ê ME + E¢ − E2 ë
é
 




Model Solution Algorithm 
 
 
 Solving for the model stationary distribution (for a given parameter 
calibration) requires the following steps: 
1. Make an initial guess for 0, the house price. 
2. Make an initial guess for 1, the interest rate paid to savers. 
3. Based on the corporate firm’s optimality condition given by (8) in Chapter 1, 
use 4 = (1 − B)>% ¶p®íî®ï@ð" · ËËÝÜ to obtain the wage. The optimality condition 
also provides the corporate capital/labor ratio implied by the interest rate 
guess: 
"̈" = ¶ ð"@p®íî®ï· ÜÜÝË. Define this capital/labor ratio as á¨. 
4. Given the price vector (1, 4, 0) and using value function iteration, solve for 
the entrepreneur value function yD(Q, 5, ℎ, E) and associated policy 
functions D(Q, 5, ℎ, E) for  ∈ {5, ℎ, , 7, G}. Solve for the worker value 




maxhyD(5, ℎ, E), yD(Q, 5, ℎ, E)i, and define optimal policy functions as 
follows: 
(Q, 5, ℎ, E) = RD(Q, 5, ℎ, E) if yD(Q, 5, ℎ, E) ≥ yD(5, ℎ, E)D(Q, 5, ℎ, E) if yD(Q, 5, ℎ, E) < yD(5, ℎ, E) . 
5. Make an initial guess b for the distribution of households, obtain b =Ψ(b), then iterate until convergence (according to desired tolerance) to fixed 
point b⋆. 
6. Clear the labor market by defining 
A% = Af − AD  , 
then compute ?% = á¨A%. Define 
?%⋆ = lf + lm − ?D − 0op . 
7. If ?% = ?%⋆ (within chosen tolerance), then the financial market clears. If not, 
update the guess for 1 and return to step 3. 
8. Compare aggregate housing demand op + n to housing supply nf. If op +n = nf (within chosen tolerance), all markets clear and the stationary 
distribution equilibrium has been obtained. Otherwise, update the guess for 0 





Section A2: Appendix for Chapter 2 
 
A2.1: Kauffman Firm Survey Sample 
 
 
The Kauffman Firm Survey (KFS) provides a large panel of data on “young” 
businesses. Firms in the sample were founded in 2004 and have been tracked 
annually.2 This panel was created using a random sample from Dun & Bradstreet’s 
database of new businesses. The target population consists of all new businesses that 
were started in 2004 in the United States, and it excludes any branch or subsidiary 
owned by an existing business or that was simply inherited from someone else. The 
sample for the first survey consisted of 4,928 businesses. 
The KFS provides a unique opportunity to study a panel of new businesses 
from startup, using available data on their revenues and expenses, number of workers, 
products, services, innovations that they possessed and developed in their early years, 
and the extent to which these businesses are involved in innovative activities. One 
drawback of the publicly available KFS data is that some variables, such as assets 
(and its components) and sales, are only reported within certain ranges.3 We set the 
value of the relevant variables to the middle value of the reporting range.4 
Our unit of observation is the firm, as defined by the KFS. The change in sales 
is constructed from total revenues from sales of goods, services, and intellectual 
                                                 
2 Data available at the time of writing extend through 2008. Firms will continue to be tracked through 
2011. See http://www.kauffman.org/kfs/ for a detailed description of the data and the actual public-use 
microdata. 
3 For example, ranges for revenues are $0, $1 to $1,000, $1,001 to $5,000, $5,001 to $10,000, $10,001 
to $25,000, $25,001 to $100,000, and $100,001 or more. 
4 The set of variables we use that present this problem are: revenue from sales of goods, services or 




property. As is standard in the literature, size is defined as the number of employees. 
We use two-digit industry deflators. Our variable expenses associated with, for 
example, design of new products, brand development, advertising, marketing, 
organizational development, or management consulting. For firm-year observations 
with missing values of SGA expenses, we compute the average ratio of SGA 
expenses to total expenses and impute SGA expenses from this ratio and total 
expenses. 
Table A2.1 reports the distribution of real sales and real SGA expenses for 
new firms (i.e., the distribution of firms in 2004) and for firms that survive until the 
end of our sample (2008). 
 
Table A2.1: Distribution of Sales and Expenses (%) 
 Year 2004 Year 2008 
Thousands of $ Sales SGA Sales SGA 
$0-$3 14.52 55.09 6.80 37.87 
$3-$10 14.39 26.40 8.71 28.02 
$10-$50 14.59 0.00 8.81 13.83 
$50-$100 28.58 16.64 22.27 15.21 
$100+ 27.92 1.87 53.40 5.07 
# firms 3,037 4,382 1,940 1,381 
Note: Sales and SGA are deflated using the GDP deflator. Source: 
KFS. 
 
Observe that many firms are relatively small, with sales and selling expenses 
below $10,000. This is still the case even after four years of existence. However, a 
non-trivial number of new firms have sales and SGA above $100,000. The 





Table A2.2 reports the distribution of newly created firms as seen in the KFS, 
a comparison with the size distribution of new firms from the Census Bureau’s 
Statistics of new Businesses data, and the distribution of firms over employment for 
our cohort of firms in 2008.5 
 
Table A2.2: Distribution of Workers (%) 
Size (employees) KFS (2004) Census (2004) KFS (2008) 
1-4 74 77 65 
5-9 15 13 18 
10-19 7 6 10 
20-99 3 4 3 
100-499 0.3 0.4 5.0 
500+ 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Note: KFS refers to Kauffman Firm Survey. Census corresponds to Office of Advocacy, Small 
Business Administration, Statistics of U.S. Businesses, U.S. Census 2004. 
 
Table A2.2 shows that a large fraction of firms start with only a few workers. 
More than 70 percent of new firms hire between one and four workers. As a 
comparison we report the distribution of new firms from the Statistics of New 
Businesses; note that the distributions are very similar. This reassures us that we have 
a representative sample of new firms, despite some differences in the distribution of 
new firms across industries and in the different methodologies used across the 
sources. Finally, and consistent with the evidence presented in Table A2.1, among 
active firms in the KFS in 2008 there is a sizeable reduction in the fraction of firms 
with less than four workers and an increase in the fraction of firms with more than 10 
workers. 
                                                 
5 For comparison, we report the distribution conditional on firms having more than one worker. In the 
KFS data, we find that in 2004, 58 percent of active firms hired zero workers; this value was 44 




Table A2.3 displays the distribution of firms across some representative 
industries and their one-year survival rates. 
 








Construction 10.0 91.9 
Manufacturing 7.1 92.0 
Wholesale 5.4 88.7 
Retail 15.9 86.1 
Transportation and Warehousing 3.4 84.7 
Information 2.7 84.6 
Finance and Insurance 4.7 95.8 
Administration and Support 9.6 91.7 
Accommodation and Food Services 4.3 77.7 
Source: Kauffman Firm Survey. 
 
 
 A2.2: Compustat and Compustat-Segment Sample 
 
 
We use Compustat’s Fundamental and Segment annual data.6 Our choice of 
firm identifier is GVKEY, and this is the variable we use for matching the Compustat 
segment file to the fundamentals file. The sample period for the fundamentals data 
ranges from 1960 to 2012, but segment data only exist from 1977 to 2012. Not all 
firms have segment data. Our year variable is extracted from the variable 
DATADATE (for both the fundamentals and the segments file). We exclude financial 
firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999, utility firms with SIC codes between 
4900 and 4999, and firms with SIC codes greater than 9000 (residual categories). 
Observations are deleted if they do not have a positive book value of assets or if gross 
                                                 





capital stock or sales are either zero, negative, or missing. The final sample is an 
unbalanced panel with more than 21,600 firms and 241,000 firm-year observations; 
of these, there are 18,700 firms and 184,000 firm-year observations with segment 
data. 
Our data variables are defined as follows. The change in sales is constructed 
from the variable SALE. As is standard in the literature, firm size is defined as the 
number of employees, using the variable EMP. We use two-digit NAICS codes to 
control for industry effects. Firm age is proxied by the number of years since the 
firm’s first-year observation in Compustat (so it is really a measure of years since IPO 
rather than age proper). All nominal variables are deflated using BEA’s two-digit, 
sector-specific price deflator for value added. 
Segment counts reflect the sum of primary and secondary four-digit SIC codes 
reported in the Compustat variables SICS1 and SICS2. Compustat reports four-digit 
SIC codes for segments throughout the sample. NAICS codes are also reported in 
later years; there are no observations in which a NAICS code is reported but a SIC 
code is not. BEA deflators for value added are only given for SIC codes until 1988; at 
that time, the BEA began reporting deflators for NAICS codes. Therefore, when 
possible, we deflate segment-level sales using 10 sector-level SIC code deflators; 
elsewhere, we deflate with 24 two-digit NAICS sector codes. Thus, SIC deflators 
reflect less industry detail than NAICS deflators due to the lack of a unique mapping 
between NAICS and SIC; for this reason, we verified that our results are robust to 
using SIC deflators at the next possible level of detail, for which there are more than 




Table A2.4 reports the distribution of real sales and real SGA expenses for 
firms in 1980 and 2008.7 Note that firms’ sales and SGE expenses are considerably 
larger than those in the KFS sample. 
 
Table A2.4: Distribution of Sales and Expenses (%) 
 Year 1980 Year 2008 
Millions of $ Sales SGA Sales SGA 
<$10 19.7 27.7 12.4 21.7 
$10-$20 9.4 12.4 5.3 12.7 
$20-$50 14.0 16.8 10.3 16.9 
$50-$100 11.8 12.0 10.1 13.1 
$100-$250 14.3 12.9 13.8 13.7 
$250+ 30.8 18.1 48.1 21.9 
# Firms 4,581 4,150 5,219 4,741 
Note: Sales and Expenses are deflated using BEA’s two-digit SIC price 
deflators for value added. Source: Compustat Fundamental. 
 
Table A2.5 reports the distribution of employment size for 1980 and 2008. To 
simplify the comparison, the size bins are the same as the ones we used for the KFS 
sample. 
 
Table A2.5: Distribution of Workers (%) 
 All firms Segment firms 
Number of employees 1980 2008 1980 2008 
1-4 1.64 1.38 1.68 1.38 
5-9 1.75 1.80 1.77 1.75 
10-19 2.49 3.14 2.51 2.79 
20-99 11.07 13.26 11.30 12.49 
100-499 23.31 21.63 23.50 20.62 
500+ 59.75 58.79 59.25 60.97 
# Firms 4,581 5,219 4,469 4,627 
Source: Compustat Fundamental and Compustat Segment. 
 
                                                 





Most firms in the Compustat sample have more than 500 workers, whereas in 
the KFS sample this value is less than 1 percent. Table A2.6 reports the distribution 
of firm age (computed as the number of years of presence in the sample). 
 
Table A2.6: Age Distribution (%) 
 All firms Segment firms 
Firm age 1980 2008 1980 2008 
1-5 18.05 26.38 18.12 20.90 
6-10 41.06 18.85 41.64 19.23 
11-15 15.06 17.34 15.10 18.63 
16-20 10.43 10.92 9.85 12.08 
21-25 0.00 7.86 0.00 8.64 
26+ 0.00 14.60 0.00 15.97 
Top censored 15.39 4.04 15.28 4.54 
# firms 4,581 5,219 4,469 4,627 
Note: “Top censored” corresponds to firms that are in our sample starting in 
1960. Source: Compustat Fundamental and Compustat Segment. 
 
We employed the following rules when constructing the Compustat 
Fundamental/Compustat Segment linked data. When multiple data source dates 
(SRCDATE) existed for one firm/data date/segment combination, we kept only the 
most recent source date. When multiple data dates existed for one firm-year-segment 
combination, we kept only the later data date unless its sales figures were missing (in 
which case we kept the earlier data date). When multiple segment identifiers existed 
for one four-digit SIC code, we combined the segments: Segment counts reflect the 
number of unique four-digit SIC codes, and segment-level employment reflects the 
sum of all reported segments within a four-digit SIC code. 
Finally, Table A2.7 shows the correlations between the variables used from 





Table A2.7: Correlations Table, Compustat Segment 
 Sales Emp. SGA Adv. SICs 
      
Entire sample, Compustat Segment 
Sales 1     
Emp. 0.797 1    
SGA 0.893 0.749 1   
Adv. 0.641 0.484 0.716 1  
SICs 0.227 0.233 0.228 0.226 1 
      
“Changers” 
Sales 1     
Emp. 0.789 1    
SGA 0.874 0.728 1   
Adv. 0.699 0.533 0.764 1  
SICs 0.205 0.240 0.199 0.206 1 
      
“Non-changers” 
Sales 1     
Emp. 0.799 1    
SGA 0.898 0.753 1   
Adv. 0.624 0.470 0.703 1  
SICs 0.229 0.227 0.231 0.228 1 
Note: All nominal variables are deflated using BEA’s two-digit, sector-specific 




A2.3: LBD-Compustat Fundamental Link 
 
 
 The LBD is constructed from the business register of the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census (see Jarmin and Miranda (2002)). It includes all nonfarm private sector 
employer establishments and firms in the United States from 1976 to 2011 and 
provides information on location, industry, and employment. Employment 
information reflects the payroll of establishments as of March 12 of a given year. The 
LBD links establishments as firms; firm identifiers reflect operational control and can 




 Both Compustat and the LBD include various firm identifiers that can be used 
for matching: employer identification numbers (EINs), two alternative business 
names (in Compustat, these are given by CONM and CONML), and addresses. We 
obtained further match flexibility by employing the SAS DQMATCH algorithm. We 
linked Compustat to the LBD by using successive “passes” that matched Compustat 
firms to LBD establishments using these identifiers with varying degrees of 
specificity.8 Early match passes relied on EINs and full business names and addresses 
(which have been standardized). Subsequent passes utilized algorithms that evaluate 
name similarity conditional on geographic matches. Final passes employed 
DQMATCH descriptors. We utilize both alternative name variables from each data 
source, thus allowing for potential matches along any combination of name variables. 
Only residual nonmatched CUSIPs are retained after each pass; by ordering such that 
match criteria become less specific with each successive pass, we ensure that the final 
data linkages are based on the highest possible match quality for each firm. 
We eliminate firm-year matches that are out of scope for Compustat activity (as 
determined by IPODATE and DLDTE when available or by time periods of non-
positive employment, sales, or share price when the former variables are missing). 
Instances in which a CUSIP was paired with multiple LBD firms were resolved by 
first dropping LBD firms with only one operating unit and then choosing the LBD 
firm with reported employment closes to Compustat reported employment. Since 
many firms have time series gaps in EIN coverage, and since business names in the 
                                                 
8 For matching purposes, we first discard from Compustat all exchange traded funds (ETFs) that can be 
easily identified, American depositary receipts (ADRs) and American depositary shares (ADSs), 
CUSIPs with non-U.S. geographical identifiers, and firms that operate only outside of North America 




LBD refer to establishments rather than firms (and occasionally change over time), 
we make additional matches by rolling firm-year matches across years when 
appropriate. 
 We find matches for about 80 percent of relevant Compustat CUSIPs in the 
LBD source data; on average, we have about 4,200 observations with relevant non-
missing data per year in our LBD-Compustat Fundamental linked data spanning from 
1977 to 2011. The resulting comingled data include sales and industry information 
from Compustat with employment and geographic information from the LBD. In the 
LBD, an establishment is a single business location with one or more employees 
(sometimes called a plant in other data sources). We classify establishment locations 
using the Census Bureau’s 2009 definitions of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), 
which are comprised of whole counties (i.e., an MSA is a collection of counties). For 
our estimation purposes, any county that is not included in an MSA is classified as its 
own MSA.9 Table A2.8 presents summary statistics from the linked dataset. 
 
Table A2.8: Summary Statistics for LBD Variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. Corr. w/ SGA 
Number of estabs 125 617 0.35 
Number of MSAs 34 99 0.34 
 
 Finally, Tables A2.9, A2.10, and A2.11 show the correlations between the 
variables used from the Compustat-LBD data for the different market definitions. 
 
                                                 
9 An alternative to this classification is to collect all counties within a state that are not included in an 
MSA and defined that collection as a single MSA so that each state has a single residual “MSA” in 
addition to proper MSAs. We also performed our analysis on data constructed with this definition, and 




Table A2.9: Correlations Table, Compustat-LBD (Establishments) 
 Sales Emp. SGA Adv. Estabs 
      
Entire sample, Compustat-LBD 
Sales 1     
Emp. 0.800 1    
SGA 0.882 0.749 1   
Adv. 0.656 0.462 0.727 1  
Estabs 0.348 0.448 0.370 0.230 1 
      
“Changers” 
Sales 1     
Emp. 0.837 1    
SGA 0.864 0.664 1   
Adv. 0.696 0.565 0.787 1  
Estabs 0.447 0.285 0.550 0.356 1 
      
“Non-changers” 
Sales 1     
Emp. 0.793 1    
SGA 0.881 0.743 1   
Adv. 0.655 0.450 0.727 1  
Estabs 0.326 0.439 0.345 0.208 1 
Note: All nominal variables are deflated using BEA’s two-digit, sector-specific 















Table A2.10: Correlations Table, Compustat-LBD (MSAs) 
 Sales Emp. SGA Adv. Estabs 
      
Entire sample, Compustat-LBD 
Sales 1     
Emp. 0.800 1    
SGA 0.883 0.749 1   
Adv. 0.656 0.4616 0.727 1  
MSAs 0.367 0.479 0.385 0.237 1 
      
“Changers” 
Sales 1     
Emp. 0.801 1    
SGA 0.875 0.653 1   
Adv. 0.680 0.487 0.766 1  
MSAs 0.367 0.410 0.360 0.230 1 
      
“Non-changers” 
Sales 1     
Emp. 0.793 1    
SGA 0.882 0.749 1   
Adv. 0.656 0.451 0.724 1  
MSAs 0.341 0.462 0.358 0.203 1 
Note: All nominal variables are deflated using BEA’s two-digit, sector-specific 















Table A2.11: Correlations Table, Compustat-LBD (Estabs*SICs) 
 Sales Emp. SGA Adv. Estabs 
      
Entire sample, Compustat-LBD 
Sales 1     
Emp. 0.802 1    
SGA 0.884 0.748 1   
Adv. 0.658 0.465 0.727 1  
Est*SIC 0.381 0.444 0.391 0.258 1 
      
“Changers” 
Sales 1     
Emp. 0.839 1    
SGA 0.855 0.637 1   
Adv. 0.701 0.577 0.800 1  
Est*SIC 0.490 0.252 0.615 0.383 1 
      
“Non-changers” 
Sales 1     
Emp. 0.798 1    
SGA 0.882 0.740 1   
Adv. 0.664 0.461 0.732 1  
Est*SIC 0.362 0.445 0.363 0.241  
Note: All nominal variables are deflated using BEA’s two-digit, sector-specific 
price deflator for value added. Source: Compustat Fundamental and LBD. 
 
 All reported statistics based on the LBD-Compustat link were reviewed and 
do not disclose confidential information. 
 
A2.4: BDS Sample 
 
 
 Table A2.12 presents the cyclical properties of workers per establishment 
computed from BDS data. Since most variables in this sample have a trend 
component, we detrended them using a linear trend when reporting the averages in 
Tables 5 (in Chapter 2) and A2.12. Table A2.13 reports the detrended and the 





Table A2.12: Number of Workers per Establishment over the Business Cycle 
Firm size Avg. # of Fraction Avg. Cyclical props., workers per estab. 
(workers) firms total emp. emp. per Wkr. per est w/ GDP Elasticity 
 (1000s) (%) plant Below Above w/ GDP 
1-4 1909 6.6 2.31 2.31 2.32 0.137 
5-9 736 7.3 6.59 6.56 6.62 0.385* 
10-19 408 8.4 12.7 12.6 12.8 0.346* 
20-49 237 11.0 24.4 24.2 24.7 0.302 
50-99 71 7.5 40.2 39.7 40.8 0.452 
100-249 35 8.2 51.4 50.6 52.4 0.897* 
250-499 10 5.2 59.0 58.2 59.8 0.706* 
500-999 5 4.8 63.2 63.0 63.3 0.312 
1000-2499 3 6.5 66.1 65.5 66.8 0.479* 
2500-4999 1 4.8 60.5 60.2 60.9 0.080 
5000+ 1 29.7 75.8 75.7 75.9 0.127 
Note: We extract a linear trend component from all variables. The “Avg. # of firms” corresponds to the 
average number of firms in each size bin in our sample (in thousands). “Fraction total emp.” is 
computed as the average of total employees in each size bin divided by total employment. “Avg. emp. 
per plant” corresponds to the average of the number of employees per establishment in each size 
category. “Wkr. per est. w/ GDP” below or above is derived from a linear regression of average 
number of workers per establishment by firm size on a constant, a linear trend, and a dummy that 
identifies periods when GDP is above trend. The value reported is the parameter on this dummy. GDP 
corresponds to log-real GDP. The trend for GDP is computed using the HP filter with parameter 6.25. 
“Elasticity w/ GDP” corresponds to the elasticity between the average number of workers per 
establishment by firm size and detrended GDP. This elasticity is derived from a linear regression of 
log-average number of workers per establishments by firm size on a constant, a linear trend, and log-
real detrended GDP. * denotes significance at the 10% level. 













Table A2:13: Averages With and Without a Time Trend 
Firm size Avg. # firms (1000s) Fraction total emp. Avg. emp. per plant 
(workers) Detrended Non-det. Detrended Non-det. Detrended Non-det. 
1-4 1909 2437 6.6 5.8 2.3 2.2 
5-9 736 941 7.3 6.6 6.6 6.5 
10-19 408 542 8.4 7.8 12.7 12.8 
20-49 237 329 11.0 10.6 24.4 24.6 
50-99 71 102 7.5 7.5 40.2 40.1 
100-249 35 54 8.2 8.5 51.4 49.9 
250-499 10 15 5.1 5.5 59.0 54.1 
500-999 5 7 4.8 5.0 63.2 58.4 
1000-2499 3 5 6.5 6.8 66.1 62.9 
2500-4999 1 2 4.8 5.2 60.5 58.9 
5000+ 1 2 29.7 30.7 75.8 61.8 
Note: The “Avg. # firms” corresponds to the average number of firms in each size bin over our sample 
(in thousands). “Fraction total emp.” is computed as the average of total employees in each size bin 
divided by total employment. “Avg. emp. per plant” corresponds to the average of the number of 
employees per establishment in each size category. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Business Dynamics Statistics. 
 
A2.5 Market Exposure and Volatility: Robustness Checks 
 
 
Table A2.15 reports estimates from equation (27) in Chapter 2 using the 
number of SIC codes as well as SGA and advertising expenses from Compustat. We 
incorporated size and age as additional controls (in addition to firm fixed effects, 
year-industry fixed effects, and a time trend). 
Table A2.16 reports estimates from equation (27) in Chapter 2 using the 
number of establishments, the number of MSAs, and the product of establishment 
counts and SIC codes using the Compustat-LBD linked dataset. In this table, too, we 
incorporated size and age as additional controls (in addition to firm fixed effects, 
year-industry fixed effects, and a time trend). 
Observe that the relationship between our measures of market exposure (SIC 
codes, establishments, MSAs, SICs×establishments, SGA expenses, and advertising 




controls. The coefficient on the appropriate market exposure measure is negative in 
all specifications other than the case of the SIC code count and the SIC 
code/establishment count product when size is included as a control. Moreover, the 
introduction of size as a control makes the estimates on market exposure 
nonsignificant. Note that this is not a surprising result based on the model: market 
exposure is highly correlated with firm size. In the data, the measures of market 
exposure and employment are also highly correlated, with correlation coefficients of 
up to 0.47. 
Finally, Table A2.17 reports the elasticity of firm-level volatility to market 
exposure based on several different specifications involving multiple market exposure 
variables and interactions. These specifications deliver very close elasticities between 




Table A2.14: Market Exposure and Firm-Level Idiosyncratic Volatility I 
 Dependent variable ln (¤ r¢ ) 
ln(SICs) - - - - - - -0.137*** -0.043** 0.013 
 - - - - - - (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
ln(SGA) -0.299*** -0.228*** -0.096*** - - - - - - 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) - - - - - - 
ln(Adv) - - - -0.126*** -0.095*** -0.011 - - - 
 - - - (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) - - - 
ln(size) - - -0.252*** - - -0.304*** - - -0.306*** 
 - - (0.014) - - (0.021) - - (0.010) 
ln(age) - -0.451*** - - -0.541*** - - -0.559*** - 
 - (0.014) - - (0.026) - - (0.016) - 
          
N 184500 184500 184500 70000 70000 70000 155200 155200 155200 
R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. All regressions include firm and industry-year fixed effects and a time 
trend. ln (¤ r¢ ) is constructed from the estimated residual of equation (1) from Chapter 2. ln(tñl) is constructed as log-real Selling, General, and Administrative 
expenses, and ln (ldy) corresponds to Advertising expenses. Industry deflators are used in every case. ln (Q¡E) corresponds to log-employment as in equation 
(1) from Chapter 2. The age of the firm corresponds to the number of years in the Compustat sample. ln (tòsQ) corresponds to four-digit SIC codes as reported in 






Table A2.15: Market Exposure and Firm-Level Idiosyncratic Volatility II 
 Dependent variable ln (¤ r¢ ) 
ln(Estabs) - - - - - - -0.081*** -0.046*** -0.005 
 - - - - - - (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
ln(MSAs) -0.094*** -0.053*** -0.002 - - - - - - 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) - - - - - - 
ln(SIC*Est) - - - -0.075*** -0.037*** 0.004 - - - 
 - - - (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) - - - 
ln(size) - - -0.282*** - - -0.283 - - -0.283*** 
 - - (0.012) - - (0.012) - - (0.012) 
ln(age) - -0.558 - - -0.558 - - -0.558 - 
 - (0.019) - - (0.019) - - (0.019) - 
          
N 129700 129700 129700 124400 124400 124400 129700 129700 129700 
R2 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. All regressions include firm and industry-year fixed effects and a time 
trend. ln (¤ r¢ ) is constructed from the estimated residual of equation (1) from Chapter 2. ln(Q5óQ), ln (otlQ), and ln (tòs ∗ Q) are the log of establishment 
count, MSA count, and product of SIC and establishment count. ln (Q¡E) corresponds to log-employment as in equation (1) from Chapter 2. The age of the firm 
corresponds to the number of years in the Compustat sample. ln (tòsQ) corresponds to four-digit SIC codes as reported in the Compustat Segment data. Data are 






Table A2.16: Market Exposure and Firm-Level Idiosyncratic Volatility III 
 Dependent variable ln (¤ r¢ ) 
ln(SICs) -0.137*** - - - 0.007 - 0.017 - - 
 (0.021) - - - (0.028) - (0.028) - - 
ln(Estabs) - -0.081*** - - (omitted) - - - (omitted) 
 - (0.009) - - - - - - - 
ln(MSAs) - - -0.094*** - - - (omitted) - -0.012 
 - - (0.010) - - - - - (0.057) 
ln(SIC*Est) - - - -0.075*** -0.076*** - - - - 
 - - - (0.008) (0.009) - - - - 
ln(SIC*MSA) - - - - - -0.085*** -0.088*** - - 
 - - - - - (0.009) (0.011) - - 
ln(Est*MSA) - - - - - - - -0.045*** -0.039 
 - - - - - - - (0.005) (0.027) 
          
N 155200 129700 129700 124400 124400 124400 124400 129700 129700 
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Note: *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. All regressions include firm and industry-year fixed effects and a time 
trend. ln (¤ r¢ ) is constructed from the estimated residual of equation (1) from Chapter 2. ln (tòsQ), ln(Q5óQ), and ln (otlQ), are the log of SIC count, 
establishment count, and MSA count, respectively. Other included variables are corresponding products of the foregoing market exposure measures. Data are 
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